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The application of big data analytics on data and any information collected, enables mobile operators 
to profile customers, depending on the historical and real time habits at certain locations and times. The 
results generated of big data analytics and carried by mobile operators can improve network 
performance, improve product offering, advance marketing strategies, a better customer experience and 
increase the revenue generated. It is with no doubt that big data analytics will create more opportunities 
to grow the economy, however, there are also challenges that come along with the opportunities. Data 
exposed to organisations, individuals and the community at large, could result in the violation of privacy 
rights. Big data analytics privacy risks are making it a challenge for big data benefits to be fully realised.  
As a result, all challenges that are brought by big data analytics privacy risks need to be addressed for 
all the benefits of big data to be realised. In order for organisations to be able to manage privacy risks, 
there needs to be an identification, root cause and assessment of these. There is a need for a standardised 
privacy risk assessment model to guide practitioners or project managers to manage privacy risks of big 
data analytics. This research study aimed to identify the cause of privacy risks during big data analytics 
operations and thereafter, develop a privacy risk identification model to assist in managing privacy 
risks.  
The research made use of a content analysis method to assess and verify the theory presented in the 
literature review. Secondary data in the form of industry reports, was collected using a qualitative 
approach. Content analysis research results are used to gauge and answer the research questions, 
together with the literature review that was conducted. The causes of privacy risks were identified in a 
form of privacy vulnerabilities and threats. Additionally, the privacy risk identification model was 
constructed and verified by the research conducted.  
Advancing technology on big data analytics will continuously bring about additional benefits to the 
organisations and data owners. The benefits should not increase the privacy risks, such that benefits are 
no longer valuable to the data owners and the organisations. Data owners and organisations benefiting 
from big data analytics should be comfortable that their data is used to their advantage and not 
otherwise. The concept of privacy is dependent on the culture, countries and jurisdiction. Privacy is a 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Advancing technology has made it a gradual evolution and increasing ability to collect, store and 
analyse information. There are applications and devices that collect data. Data collected is analysed to 
give predictions, trends and build up a knowledge base. These applications and devices collect, store 
and process a variety of a huge amount of data collected at high speed. The phenomenon of this type of 
data is referred to as big data [1]. According to [2], a big data lifecycle consists of four phases, that is; 
data collection; data storage; data analytics and knowledge creation. Big data analytics is the most 
crucial phase in the value chain of big data. Big data analytics involves a lot of data mining and statistical 
analysis, depending on the goal or the expected knowledge creation that have to be achieved. The big 
data analytics phase makes use of business intelligence and analytics. Analytics include techniques, 
methods and applications that analyse data to make sense for an organisation to conduct business [3]. 
There are many different organisations that could benefit from big data. Telecommunications, health 
services, marketing, credit risk and national security organisations are most likely to benefit from big 
data [4]. Big data benefits are obtained directly or indirectly by the data owners, that is; individuals, 
society and the community. Big data benefits could also be obtained by the organisation that is analysing 
the data collected from data owners. 
 
In the telecommunications sector, mobile operators have been generating and carrying massive data. 
Previously there has not been great value extracted from the massive data generated and carried by 
mobile operators [5]. It has always been desirable to make use of this data. Traditional analytics made 
use of this data by extracting meaningful information from data on billing, operations and other internal 
systems from the organisation. Only structured data could be used by traditional analytics to extract 
meaningful information. Traditional analytics have limitations when it comes to semi-structured data, 
unstructured data and real time analysis. An increase of the data generated and carried by mobile cellular 
networks can now be referred to as big data [6]. Big data analytics can extract greater insights from data 
generated and carried compared to traditional analytics. Big data analytics operations are able to retrieve 
more insightful information from different forms of data coming from different scattered sources on 
real time. Big data analytics is becoming the solution to the limitations of traditional data analytics. 
Advancing technology enables cellular mobile networks to generate and carry sensitive personal 
information. The application of big data analytics on data and information collected, enables mobile 
operators to profile customers depending on the historical and real time habits of certain locations and 
times. The results generated of big data analytics and carried by mobile operators can improve network 
performance, improve product offering, advance marketing strategies, provide a better customer 
experience and increase the revenue generated [7].  
 
Big data will create more opportunities to grow the economy, however there are also challenges that 
come along with the opportunities [8]. Data exposed to organisations, individuals and the community 
at large, could result in the violation of privacy rights. Big data privacy risks, cutting across all phases 
of the big data lifecycle, are making it a challenge for big data benefits to be fully realised [4]. Big data 
privacy concerns are mainly due to personal privacy and information privacy [1]. Personal privacy 
includes personal information and views about that person. Information privacy includes health 
information, political beliefs, religious beliefs and discrimination. According to [9], approximately 49% 
of academic journals touch on the big data of 13 dominant topics. Big data security and privacy is one 
of the areas that is not well researched at 2% and it has decreased to 1%. This points out that there is a 







Authors [10], [11], [12], [13] agree that privacy is the right of an individual or group to seclude 
themselves. There are two main forms of privacy: 
i. Physical privacy: is the right or ability of an individual to have their own physical space. 
ii. Information privacy: is the right or ability of an individual to manage information about themselves. 
Managing information includes; creating, modifying, deleting and deciding how and to which 
extent the information would be shared with others. 
There are also two main forms of privacy intrusion: 
i. Physical privacy intrusion: is where an individual’s right to their own personal physical space, 
which has been violated. The intrusion can come in the form of unwelcome or uninvited personal 
bodily searches or interference or surveillance related to physical space. 
ii. Information privacy intrusion: is where an individual’s right of managing personal information has 
been compromised or violated. Intrusion can come in the form of collecting personal information 
through surveillance, modifying and sharing information without the owner’s consent. 
Privacy risk is the harm arising through an intrusion to privacy. Harm could be tangible, intangible and 
societal [10],[12],[13]. It may extend to any denial of fundamental rights and freedoms. According to 
ISO 27005 [14] ‘… risk is the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or 
group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization’, measuring it in terms of both the likelihood 
of an event and its consequence. The above definition of risk will be used as a risk framework in this 
research. 
According to [15], [16], big data analytics operations can increase privacy risks. There is a need for risk 
models to be developed to identify suitable balances and techniques that can be used to mitigate privacy 
risks. It is during this phase where privacy risks need to be assessed and evaluated before conducting 
the planned data mining and statistical analysis. The assessment of privacy risks over benefits will give 
an indication on how the risks could be mitigated before or when the benefits are realised. 
 
Risk management standards and methodologies have been the critical tools used by data protection laws 
to ensure data processing risks are managed [17]. In addition, different entities all over the world are 
making an effort on implementing privacy risk management models, tools and methodologies [18], 
[19], [20]. In order to alleviate the interpretation of privacy from different entities all over the world, 
the disjoint between data protection, privacy and regulatory privacy requirements should be bridged by 
the assessment that needs to be applied by organisations on risks and benefits of big data analytics. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
There is a need for a standardised privacy risk assessment model to guide practitioners or project 
managers to manage privacy risks on big data analytics. 
1.4 Research objectives 
The objective of the research was to identify the cause of privacy risks during big data analytics 
operations and thereafter, construct a privacy risk identification model to assist in managing privacy 
risks. In order for organisations to be able to manage privacy risks, there needs to be an identification 
of the root cause and assessment of privacy risks. Authors who have published papers on big data 
privacy are calling for more applied research [9]. All challenges that are brought by big data privacy 
need to be addressed for all the benefits of big data to be realised. There is a potential risk of big data 
privacy being a loophole for misuse and violation. Analytics is the function that adds value before 





stage. Organisations will be able to plan beforehand on how to mitigate all the risks before knowledge 
is created. 
1.5 Research questions 
The research seeks to answer the following questions:  
i. What are the privacy vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks during the big data analytics 
phase?  
ii. What is the risk identification model that can be used to identify privacy risks during the analytics 
phase? 
1.6 Research design 
The research followed a deductive research approach where a privacy risk assessment model 
constructed from the literature review was verified by the data collected. The deductive approach 
followed the below structure of the research in Figure 1.1, starting with the literature review aimed at 
gathering theory to answer the research questions. The research then focused on assessing the theory of 
the literature review to answer the research questions.  
The research used the content analysis method to assess the theory in the literature review. An in-depth 
study was done on content analysis research to enable the constructed model to be verified. Secondary 
data was collected using a qualitative approach. Secondary data was collected from industry 
documented reports, where data collection techniques that were to be used, may have varied. The 
content analysis research results were used to gauge and answer the research questions together with 
the literature review.  
1.7 Structure of the research 
The proposed structure of the research included the following content in Figure 1.1. 
 















Figure 1.1 provides the outline of the report of the research undertaken of Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Chapter 1 introduced the topic of the research being conducted. It presented the problem statement, 
research questions and the need for the research. Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the literature 
of the following subsections; (a) big data analytics privacy risks analysis (b) big data privacy risks 
assessment model. In Chapter 3 the research method used to conduct the research is discussed. Chapter 
4 presents the data collected and the analysis of these. The research used the qualitative approach, 
seeking to conduct interviews with telecommunication industry experts. Data collected was analysed 
and discussed based on the research topic. Chapter 5 concludes on the findings of the research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Advancing technology on big data analytics will continuously bring about additional benefits to the 
organisations and data owners. The benefits should not increase privacy risks, such that benefits are no 
longer valuable to the data owners and the organisations. Data owners and organisations benefiting from 
big data analytics should be comfortable that their data is used to their advantage and not otherwise.  
The concept of privacy is dependent on the culture, countries and jurisdiction. Privacy is a sensitive 





2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Risk management has been the critical tool used by data protection laws to ensure how data processing 
risks are managed [17]. In the big data era, there has been a lack of formal, structured and standard risk 
management processes created by organisations or regulators. This creates a challenge to quickly 
respond, keep up and be in alignment with advancing technology and human behaviour. There is also 
an opportunity to develop effective big data privacy risk management tools, using existing risk 
management tools and frameworks based on impacts of the harm and benefits brought by big data.  
Authors [21], [22], [23] and [24] reflected on an overlap between security and privacy risk assessments. 
These authors additionally reflected on the overlap between security and privacy requirements 
engineering. Risk assessment and requirements engineering of well-established security methods do not 
entirely address all privacy issues. It appears that existing risk management methodologies and 
principles can be considered as an opportunity to improve privacy framework. Risk management is a 
valuable tool to identify and assess risk impacts in accordance with the implementation of privacy 
compliance requirements. It does not change privacy regulations, rather it assists to accept, avoid and 
mitigate privacy issues that cannot be weighed against the big data benefits. In actual fact, it takes into 
account many other factors including the rights of individuals, the likelihood of data processing 
resulting in individual or societal impacts. 
According to ISO 31000 [25], the ‘… organization should identify sources of risk, areas of impacts, 
events, their causes and their potential consequences. The aim is to generate a comprehensive list of 
risks based on those events that might create, enhance, prevent, degrade, accelerate or delay the 
achievement of objectives’. Risk assessment should assist to identify the impact of privacy risks. 
According to [26] and [27], privacy risks assessment should check if the likelihood of the identified 
threat could result in certain harm of certain degrees of seriousness, while trying to balance it against 
the benefits. Harm could be tangible or intangible damage, injury or a negative impact on the reputation 
of an individual or society. It can be viewed as the denial of human rights and freedom. Threats should 
be considered throughout the big data lifecycle. It should be expected for threats to appear early or 
emerge later through the big data lifecycle. Some of the threats change or disappear through the process. 
Threats appearing early in the process could give birth or contribute to threats emerging later in the 
process.  
There should be consensus on what constitutes harm. It is expected that the impact might differ from 
country to country or culture to culture. There should be no major differences in categories to achieve 
common understanding. Common understanding should be the driver to protect the common effective 
data that minimises any negative impact. Organisations need to take a structured approach on how data 
is collected, stored, extracted, used and shared on a daily basis. This calls for responsible and 
accountable organisations that will demonstrate compliance by making sure that the privacy 
requirements are implemented. The aim of the literature review was to review common understanding 
and answer the research questions on big data analytics privacy risks.  
2.2 Big data analytics privacy risk analysis 
2.2.1 Input to big data analytics 
It is still not clear how ‘big’ the data has to be to qualify as ‘big data’[28]. Authors [28],[16],[29] agreed 
that big data has five characteristics, while another author, as in [30], only reflected three of five 
characteristics. Three common characteristics of all these authors are volume, variety and velocity. The 
other 2 characteristics are value and veracity, as reflected by the authors. These characteristics are 
referred to as five V’s or three V’s. It was noticed that authors reflecting only three V’s released their 





attributes of big data characteristics may change in future. For an example, advancing technology may 
allow characteristics to change thresholds that they currently have today. It is expected that there are no 
universal benchmarks for velocity, volume and variety in big data. If one of the characteristics of the 
three V’s changes its dimensions as a result, it may also affect the other 2, even though they may be 
independent of each other in other cases. 
2.2.2 The five V’s 
i. Volume - Volume in big data is referred to as size, scale, amount and dimension. The size of 
data collected could range from terabytes to zettabytes.  
ii. Velocity - The velocity in big data is referred to as speed. The speed is referencing the rate at 
which data is generated. This also includes how fast the data generated is changing as the 
processing of data could be in real time. 
iii. Variety - The variety in big data is referred to as the richness of the data. Data could be collected 
in many different formats. The formats of data could be structured or not. The structured data 
could be data records and unstructured data including image, video, audio and so forth. 
iv. Value - The value in big data is referred to as usefulness. The usefulness is where data is 
analysed to benefit the organisation or data owners. 
v. Veracity - The veracity in big data is referred to as data certainty and integrity or 
trustworthiness. The sources of data should be trustworthy of the origin and authenticity. Data 
collected should also be valid because it might lead to false interpretation. 
 
2.2.3 Big data structure 
Authors [16], [15], [2] also agreed that big data can be in the form of structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured data. 
2.2.3.1 Structured data 
This form of data is easy to model. It can be analysed by traditional data analytics. It can be easily 
stored, processed and visualised. It does not require advanced techniques to query and process since it 
is run in relational databases or spreadsheets. 
2.2.3.2 Semi-structured data  
This form of data is similar to structured data; despite that, it does not follow a certain model. It may 
contain tags and markers used to recognise and define other components, together with hierarchical 
representation of fields within the data. 
2.2.3.3 Unstructured data 
This type of data does not have a predefined format. It could be generated from text, videos, photographs 
and audio. It requires advanced new techniques of processing because it cannot be easily represented in 
a rigid form. 
The definition of big data is derived from the characteristics and the form of data when it is being 
extracted or collected. It is important that the characteristics and forms of data are understood and taken 
into consideration. The big data lifecycle starts with the input to big data, which is data collection. The 
input to big data analytics could become complex if all the characteristics and forms of data are a 
combination of everything. The complexity introduced calls for the risk assessments to be done 
throughout the big data lifecycle. The risks identified may contribute to privacy risks, which contribute 





2.2.4 Privacy threats and vulnerabilities on big data analytics 
2.2.4.1 Overview 
The aim of big data analytics is to give predictions, trends and to build a knowledge base for 
organisations to extract insights to make informed decisions. The input to big data analytics has to be 
prepared for analytics and thereafter, analytics techniques are applied for a desired goal. The steps 
followed in preparation for data analytics are referred to as knowledge discovery followed by the 
application of the analytics and knowledge creation. Knowledge discovery steps help to segment data 
for better representation in preparation for the applications of the analytics. The application of big data 
analytics is where the techniques are applied to give predictions and trends resulting in knowledge 
creation. Authors [28],[2],[31] referred to similar steps of knowledge discovery that are; (a) data 
collection; (b) extraction, cleaning and annotation; and (c) data integration, aggregation and 
representation. The knowledge discovery steps are followed by (d) the application of analytics and (e) 
knowledge creation. In summary, there are three main categories to analyse big data analytics, that is; 
(a) data collection (b) analysis and processing of data and (c) knowledge creation. Table 2.1 below, 
shows the allocation of each step to categories. The steps are assigned to a category according to their 
similarities and uniqueness of the activities involved in each step. The threats and vulnerabilities 
analysis will be done on each big data analytics category, to show understanding of what leads to 
privacy risks. 
Table 2.1: Big data analytics category 
# Big data analytics operational steps Category 
a Data collection Data collection 
b Extraction, cleaning and annotation 
Analysis and processing of 
data 
c Data integration, aggregation and representation 
d Application of analytics 
e Knowledge creation Knowledge creation 
 
2.2.4.2 Privacy threats and vulnerabilities in data collection 
The vulnerabilities and threats in data collection could be experienced when data is collected, captured, 
entered, recorded and stored. Data privacy requirements should consider data acquisition as part of the 
data lifecycle framework [15]. Author [15], mentioned that data acquisition should consider technology 
mechanisms and tools to prevent data collection devices from acquiring data without the consent of the 
owner. In the case where consent is given, the data owner should be able to give preference on how the 
data collected should be used. The technology mechanisms put in place should automatically prevent 
the devices collecting data in certain locations or at least notify the data owners when recording devices, 
like Google glasses are used. Authors [32] continue to emphasise the importance of ethical and 
trustworthy services of getting user’s explicit consent before applying any analytical methods, such as 
profiling a user. Authors [15] and [32] are in agreement that data collected without the data owner’s 
explicit consent, is a vulnerability to privacy. Organisations that have an ability to collect data without 
the data owner’s consent, become threats. There will be a privacy risk posed if there are no measures in 
place to make sure an organisation only collects data where consent has been given.  
According to [15], data privacy cannot be safeguarded if data security is not ensured. Data security has 
three basic requirements, which are confidentiality, integrity and availability [33]. Confidentiality refers 
to data protection from unauthorised accesses; integrity refers to data protection from unauthorised 
modifications; and availability refers to data being available to authorised users. Authors [15] 
mentioned that data security could be a challenge to big data, due to merging and integrating data from 
multiple sources, with different access policies that need to be enforced in terms of confidentiality, 





collected and used, due to data that could be faulty and incorrectly interpreted by the intruders. Lack of 
data security or protection is when privacy is vulnerable, while privacy risk is created when there is a 
threat of unauthorised access to data collected. 
Authors [15] also mentioned that the requirement of data integrity has been generalised to data 
trustworthy, which refers to data being free of errors, up to date, acquired from trusted sources and 
surety of data not being modified by unauthorised subjects. Authors further touch on the research that 
should be conducted on techniques that should control and check the quality of data collected, and if 
used for the intended purpose. It is mentioned that recent studies show that data quality decreases 
because people are untruthful on social networks as they are not sure of their privacy. Authors [31] 
referred to data integrity principles that should be considered during data collection. According to data 
integrity principles, data collected should have a purpose and be relevant to the purpose of use. Data 
collected should also be accurate, complete, up to date and applicable to the timelines. The organisations 
should take measures of validating data and make sure inaccurate data or incomplete data is rectified 
before it is used. The authors further advised that there should be data quality checks to answer from 
where the data that was used, was acquired; what data entails; how it was cleaned, formatted and 
integrated; and what geographic area(s) are represented in the data. Authors [16] also highlighted that 
large volumes are not always a good measure of data quality; it is important that validity and trust levels 
of data collected are still ensured. Lack of measures in place of data integrity raises a privacy 
vulnerability. Organisations having access and making use of this data, are threats to privacy and might 
be causing privacy risks.  
2.2.4.3 Privacy threats and vulnerabilities in the analysis and processing of data 
2.2.4.3.1 Extraction, cleaning and annotation 
The process of extraction, cleaning and annotation of big data, generally requires computational 
methods. The models used to extract and clean information may consider other data collected as 
important and others discarded [34]. There is a privacy vulnerability where information deemed as 
important, is not extracted due to computational methods and misrepresentation of data during data 
collection [35], [36]. Additionally, data deemed to be cleaned could still have errors. Computational 
methods used, need to cater for the variety of data as there might be a risk of data not being recognised 
by a computational method. It is important that metadata is also extracted as it could show the source 
of information in order to verify the usefulness of information [34]. Organisations making use of 
inadequate computational methods become threats, and a privacy risk is posed if vulnerabilities are not 
addressed. 
2.2.4.3.2 Data integration, aggregation and representation 
The vulnerabilities and threats in data integration, aggregation and representation are mainly due to 
different forms of data that could be stored in different systems and understanding or interpretation of 
what they really represent. Data fields could be coming from legacy systems to be integrated and 
aggregated with new data being collected or extracted having different sizes and formats [35]. It is 
critical that data being integrated and aggregated share the same attributes and metadata, such that all 
fields are matched, checked and populated. Author [15] highlighted the challenge of integrating and 
merging data from multiple sources with different access control policies. Policy conflict and 
integration becomes more complex on privacy-aware access control policies. Authors [16] and [32] 
highlighted another challenge of sensitive data that is assigned special attention in being integrated with 
normal data, and thereafter being treated in the same way, thus causing privacy vulnerability to sensitive 
data. Programmed tests of data sensitivity and quality applied should be relevant to integration, such 
that there are no discrepancies. The tests may yield positive results due to how they have been 
programmed. For example, certain date formats may pass the test while being read and interpreted 
differently [31]. The analytic tools used to integrate and aggregate dates could also not be in a mature 
state of giving accurate information resulting in flawed output data. The analytic tool integrating, 





The organisations making use of the inadequate analytic tools are threats to privacy and this may pose 
a privacy risk. 
2.2.4.3.3 Application of analytics 
The implementation of data analytics comes with its own privacy vulnerabilities and threats, mainly 
due to them being system driven. In some cases, relying only on the use of the analytics does not give 
good clarification. Analytics need scrutiny and best decisions are made where there is human reasoning 
to add other factors [31], [37]. Human reasoning assists where there might be incomplete understanding 
of what the system results represent, due to it still being in its infancy stage. For example, the results of 
the analytics could be skewed when the data was collected there was an event that took place at a certain 
location during that specific time period. There needs to be a quantified margin of error and statistical 
confidence presented for the output results. Even when the statistical confidence is presented, there still 
needs to be scrutiny on the negative results as they could be used incorrectly if the analytics are 
incorrect. Other forms of analytic methods are still in their early stages of maturing to give better results 
[37]. There needs to be an indication of how the use of the techniques and methods can be trusted. The 
analytic method might have limitations to data size, and thus processing only what they could [34]. The 
other factor may be the input to big data analytics. The data and information quality are critical. The 
last two characteristics of big data (value and veracity) are very important when it comes to the 
application of big data analytics. It is imperative that there is a form of scale of the value and veracity 
of big data. The value and veracity scale will determine how much information or data is trustworthy. 
If there are errors in the input data, analytics may introduce more or less errors affecting the accuracy 
of the results [35], [36], [34]. The application of analytics and output may cause privacy vulnerability 
when the results processed have errors, faulty or are incorrect, especially significant when output data 
can cause harm. The organisations making use of analytical methods that result in incorrect information 
generated are threats to privacy. This could pose a privacy risk to the application of analytics 
2.2.4.4 Privacy threats and vulnerabilities in knowledge creation 
Knowledge creation is the critical step in big data analytics, where the benefits of big data analytics are 
realised. In order to mitigate privacy risks, knowledge creation requires knowledge created to be 
monitored and controlled. According to [38], a knowledge management framework within systems 
thinking, should consider the following factors; purpose/objective; knowledge; technology; learning 
and people. In big data, management and governance should be based on the following steps; risk 
assessment; strategy statement; policy statement; and process and procedures [30]. These steps 
compliment the knowledge management factors and highlight privacy vulnerability and threats in the 
following manner: 
Reviewing [38] and [30], it is seen that purpose/objective come from the strategy statement and these 
should be in place in an organisation to minimise privacy vulnerability of the knowledge created being 
used for what it was not intended. All stakeholders, including senior management, should form part of 
the strategy statement on how the knowledge created will be used. In drafting the scope, responsibilities, 
dependencies, timelines and resources; all stakeholders should consider how objectives/purpose will be 
achieved with a view of minimising privacy vulnerability. Additionally it is imperative to ensure 
integrity and the trust level of the knowledge created before making a decision [16]. According to [37], 
knowledge created from big data analytics, requires human intervention to analyse and give 
understanding to human geography (emotions, values, beliefs, politics, culture, economics). 
Knowledge and technology factors from a knowledge management framework, become the drivers of 
the policy statement. The policy statement becomes critical to cater for legal considerations, technical 
information architecture and platform infrastructure with regards to the use and compliance of 
knowledge created from big data. Data security governance structures, policy and a compliance 
framework should be in place to minimise this as a privacy vulnerability. Under technical information, 





by information management and a security framework. Authors [16] reflected on the importance of 
securing information generated from analytics, such that it is not altered by intruders. Access to 
knowledge created should be managed by strong access control systems. According to [36], in order to 
protect privacy, the system should have restrictions to access data, such that the system should be able 
to anonymise data fields so that individual’s records cannot be pinpointed. It is realised that authors  
[16], [2] and [36] were in agreement on data security and access control management that should be in 
place during knowledge creation. Considering that there are no measures to mitigate this privacy 
vulnerability and if there is also a threat internally or externally, privacy will be at risk. The policy 
statement drills down and touches on the processes and procedures. The steps of processes and 
procedures go along with people and learnings that are factors of knowledge management. Process and 
procedures become the precise guidelines that include people and learning on how the knowledge 
created is going to be utilised to benefit the organisation, ensuring that all aspects to mitigate privacy 
risks are covered. This basically points out the ‘dos and don’ts’ in order to realise the benefits of big 
data, while making sure compliance is taken into consideration. 
2.2.4.5 Summary privacy vulnerabilities and threats 
Table 2.2 below presents the summary of privacy vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks 
during big data analytics. It is mentioned in Chapter 1 that ‘… risk is the potential that a given threat 
will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization’ 
[14]. In order to realise the benefits of big data analytics, while managing privacy risks, the 
vulnerabilities and threats summarised, need to be mitigated by putting measures in place to guard the 
threats from exploiting the vulnerabilities. The analysis of big data analytics above has been divided 
into three categories, which are (a) data collection (b) analysis and processing of data and (c) knowledge 
creation. The summary of the vulnerabilities and threats extracted are based on the themes presented 
from reviewed academic papers.  
Table 2.2: Summary of privacy vulnerabilities and threats 
Privacy vulnerabilities and threats on big data analytics 




Privacy threats Sources 
Data collection Data owner consent Organisations or external 
parties with access to data  





processing of data 
Data computational 
methods 
Organisations or external 
parties making use of 
computational methods and 
data analytic processing tools 
and technology. 
[36], [16], [15], 
 [32], [37], [31], 
 [35], [34] Data analytic 




Knowledge creation Access control Organisations or external 
parties with access to 
knowledge created 
[36], [16], [38], 










2.3 Privacy risk assessment model on big data analytics 
2.3.1 Review of standards and methodologies on risk assessment 
It has been mentioned that risk management is a valuable tool to identify and assess the impact of the 
risk in accordance with the implementation of privacy compliance requirements. It does not change 
privacy regulations, rather it assists to accept, avoid and mitigate privacy risks that cannot be weighed 
against big data benefits. The following standards and methodologies are reviewed and compared to 
give an understanding of existing risk assessment models. 
2.3.1.1 ISO 31000:2018 Risk management — principles and guidelines 
ISO 31000:2018 is an international standard of a risk management framework that provides guidelines 
on managing risks to any organisation [39], [25]. The risk assessment process that reflects risk 
identification comprises of risk identification, analysis and evaluation steps as shown in Figure 2.1 
below: 
 
Figure 2.1: ISO 31000:2018 risk management process [39] 
2.3.1.2 ISO/IEC 27005:2018 Information security risk management 
ISO/IEC 27005:2018 is the guideline for the organisation in the area of information security risk 
management [40], [14]. It is compliant with ISO 31000:2018 above. The main difference between these 
2 is that ISO/IEC 27005:2018 risk assessment is split into risk analysis and risk evaluation as shown in 






Figure 2.2: ISO/IEC 27005:2018 information security risk management process [14] 
2.3.1.3 NIST SP 800-30 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-300 publication is a risk analysis 
methodology formed under the US Department of Commerce [41]. The risk assessment methodology 
in the guide starts with the risk assessment process, followed by an explicit risk model and an 
assessment approach. This research study will only focus on the risk assessment process as shown in 
Figure 2.3 to evaluate the risk identification considerations.  
 
Figure 2.3: NIST SP 800-30 guide for conducting risk assessments process [41] 
2.3.1.4 CRAMM 
CRAMM is a risk analysis methodology that was developed by the Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA). The CCTA forms part of the UK government [42]. CCTA Risk 
Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) purpose is to provide government departments with an 
automated tool, based on a qualitative risk assessment methodology. CRAMM risk analysis 





to this research study, data is mentioned as one of the assets. The second phase is the assessment of 
threats and vulnerabilities. The third phase is the analysis and management of risk.  
 
2.3.1.5 CNIL Methodology for privacy risk management 
Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) is a French methodology for privacy 
risk management[19], [12]. The CNIL reflects the five steps with regards to a privacy risk management 
approach as shown in Figure 2.4 below:  
 
Figure 2.4: CNIL methodology for privacy risk management process [19] 
2.3.2 Comparisons of risk assessment standards and methodologies  
Risk assessment standards and methodologies have been reviewed with a focus on risk identification in 
order to address the second research question. The review uses the functional approach as described in 
[43]. The selected risk assessment standards and methodologies reviewed above, have been compared 
to the wide selection of other models already compared in [40], [44], [45], [46]. Using the bottom-up 
approach, the outputs of the risk identification process were found to be common. The common outputs 
are asset identification, vulnerability identification, threat identification and outcomes as shown in 
Table 2.3. The process of identifying assets, vulnerability and threat assists to scope and target events 
that could occur, resulting in catastrophic impacts around those assets. The assessment of identified 
assets, vulnerabilities and threats result in an outcome, which is considered as the risk identified. Table 
2.2 reflects the comparison of outputs to each selected assessment model. Each output is evaluated 
against the reviewed model by checking if it is fully addressed, partially addressed or not addressed. 
The scores were converted into quantitative data for sum calculation. In order to construct a privacy 
risk identification model, the fully addressed outputs (vulnerability, threat and outcome) are to be 
reviewed further.  
Table 2.3: Risk identification output comparison 
Scores: “” = 2 (completely covered); “”=1(partially covered) and “-“= 0 (not covered) 
Risk identification 
output  











Asset    -  - 6 
Vulnerability       10 
Threat      10 






2.3.3 Towards the privacy risk identification model 
2.3.3.1 Overview 
The outputs of Table 2.3 show agreement with the risk definition in the introduction of this research. 
Risk is identified where there is a threat that could use vulnerabilities of an asset to cause harm. The 
asset in the context of this research, is the data which is constant throughout. A further review of 
identifying fully addressed outputs (vulnerability, threat and outcome) is needed. Table 2.2.2 only 
addresses the review of identifying the privacy vulnerabilities and threats. Outcome identification that 
will result in risk identification, still needs to be reviewed. 
According to [26] and [27], the assessment of using scores with reference to a privacy risk score is 
based on qualitative approach and quantitative approach or both approaches. A privacy score could be 
used to measure the likelihood of the identified threat or vulnerability that could result in the certain 
harm of a certain degree of seriousness. The qualitative and quantitative analysis approaches are 
described below:  
2.3.3.1.1 Qualitative analysis 
The analysis based on the qualitative approach considers the context of the risk and is analysed based 
on quality. It could be based on one measure of quality that needs to be used throughout the analysis. A 
qualitative approach is used when there is insufficient data to use a quantitative approach. 
2.3.3.1.2 Quantitative analysis  
The risk score is mathematically defined as follows [40]: 
Risk score = Impact x Probability 
Risk = c(A) x p(A) 
Where:  
c(A) - Impact of event A 
p(A) - Probability of event A 
 
2.3.3.1.3 Qualitative and quantitative 
The risk should be analysed from two perspective; the probability and the impact. The risk impact (how 
serious) and risk probability (how likely) can be analysed in a qualitative or quantitative manner [47].  
2.3.3.2 Privacy vulnerability 
Privacy vulnerabilities have already been identified from the review of these, and threats during big 
data analytics steps as shown in Table 2.2 above and are considered to occur during big data analytics 
[12], [17], [48]. Table 2.4 below is the guideline to the assessment of vulnerabilities during a risk 
assessment as reflected in [41]. Table 2.4 reflects qualitative, quantitative and a description of the 
severity of vulnerability. The privacy risk identification process should start by assessing identified 
vulnerabilities as in Table 2.4 below: 
Table 2.4: Privacy vulnerability severity 
 
 
Qualitative  Quantitative Description 
Very Low 0.1 Vulnerability is not a concern 
Low 0.3 Vulnerability is a minor concern 
Moderate 0.5 Vulnerability is a moderate concern 
High 0.7 Vulnerability is a high concern  
Very High 0.9 Vulnerability is exposed and a very high concern; this could 





2.3.3.3 Likelihood of privacy threat 
Threats assessment is a critical step within the risk identification process that assesses the likelihood of 
a threat source and events that could result in severe impacts. Threat events are based on the context of 
the project or the environment where the risk should be identified. Table 2.2 above reflects the 
identification of privacy threat sources. The threat events, initiated by threat sources using 
vulnerabilities, could result in some form of harm. Table 2.5 below, is the guideline to assess the 
likelihood of threat events that could occur resulting in some form of harm.  
Table 2.5: Likelihood of privacy threat 
Qualitative  Quantitative Description 
Very low 0.1 Threat event is highly unlikely to cause harm 
Low 0.3 Threat event is unlikely to cause harm 
Moderate 0.5 Threat event is somewhat likely to cause harm 
High 0.7 Threat event is highly likely to cause harm 
Very high 0.9 Threat event is almost certain to cause harm 
 
2.3.3.4 Overall likelihood 
The overall likelihood is based on the combination of the vulnerability severity shown in Table 2.4 and 
threat likelihood as in Table 2.5. The overall likelihood can be obtained by following a guide in [41]. 
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a privacy threat and the independent variable is vulnerability 
severity.   
2.3.3.5 Privacy risk outcome 
The privacy risk outcome is ultimately the risk identified from the likelihood of threat events and the 
impact they could present. The impact of threat events is considered as harm or negative impacts to be 
avoided. There should be consensus and common understanding on what constitutes harm. Common 
understanding should be the drive to common effective data protection that minimises negative impacts 
[21], [49]. There are three types of harm; namely tangible harm, intangible harm and societal harm, that 
threats and vulnerabilities could present [50]. Depending on the context, tangible harm may require 
prioritisation over intangible harm and societal harm.  
The types of impacts in the form of harm could be weighted differently, depending on each threat event. 
Table 2.6 is the guideline to assess the level of impact presented by each threat event. Table 2.6 reflects 
the qualitative, quantitative and the description of the impact level.  
Table 2.6: Impact level assessment 
Qualitative Quantitative Description 
Very Low 0.1 Threat event to have a negligible impact on tangible harm, 
intangible harm and societal harm 
Low 0.3 Threat event to have a limited impact on tangible harm, intangible 
harm and societal harm 
Moderate 0.5 Threat event to have a serious impact on tangible harm, intangible 
harm and societal harm 
High 0.7 Threat event to have a severe or catastrophic impact on tangible 
harm, intangible harm and societal harm 
Very High 0.9 Threat event to have multiple, severe or catastrophic impact on 






The actual risk level is determined by the combination of the overall likelihood and level of impact as 
in Table 2.6. The risk level can been derived by following a guide in [41]. 
In summary, the steps in Figure 2.5 reflect the guide to identify privacy risks based on Table 2.4, Table 
2.5 and Table 2.6 above. The steps are the guide to the constructed privacy risk identification model.  
 
Figure 2.5: Privacy risk identification steps 
2.3.3.6 Privacy risk identification model 
From the literature reviewed, 
Table 2.7 is the constructed big data analytics privacy risk identification model. It takes into 
consideration privacy vulnerability, threats and the impact identified. Intersections from the model 
require the following judgements to be made; (a) how likely could harm arise from any relevant threat 
event? This is an overall likelihood, (b) How serious would this harm be if it arose from the threat? This 
is the level of impact as described in Table 2.6. The combination of the likelihood and seriousness 
should determine the privacy risk level. This model follows the process as described in Figure 2.5. 
Table 2.7: Constructed privacy risk identification model 
Big data analytics privacy assessment model 
Big data processing 



























  How serious?       
Intangible 
harm 





  How serious?       
How likely?             
Step 1: Vulnerabilities assessment
Using vulnerabilities identified in Table 2.2, assess each 
vulnerability to identify the severity based on Table 2.4
Step 2: Threats assessment
Using threats identified in Table 2.2, assess the likelihood of 
threat events that could occur resulting in some form of harm 
based on Table 2.4
Step 3: Overall likelihood
Determine overall likelihood by combining vulnerability 
severity in step 1 with threat likelihood in step 2.
Step 4: Level of impact
Assess the type of harm that the threat event identified, could 
present to identify the level of impact.
Step 5: Risk level
Determine the risk level by combining overall likelihood on 






harm How serious?       
2.4 Conclusion 
The literature review conducted was driven by 2 research questions. Research Question 1 reviewed the 
theory on big data analytics privacy risks by looking at the vulnerabilities and threats, which are the 
main causes of privacy risks. Research Question 2 reviewed the theory on standards and methodologies 
used to identify privacy risk. Additionally, a model to identify privacy risk is constructed. The literature 
review provided answers to both the research questions, which gives direction to the actual research 










3 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to answer research questions, a research method is required to show how the research would 
be conducted. There are different research methods based on the different types of questions. In the 
following sections, a research strategy evaluation based on the research questions was conducted to 
determine the appropriate research method. A carefully thought out research design is presented; the 
main research purpose and strategy were identified; and the reasons for choosing a method are 
explained; and the process of content analysis is explained, using secondary data as a chosen method. 
Additionally, validity, reliability and ethical issues were considered. 
3.2 Research design 
According to [51], research design involves systematising research activities, including the collection 
of data, in a manner that will fulfil the research objective. Research design is essential as it enables 
running various research operations smoothly; composing research that is efficient while yielding 
maximum information with the minimal expenditure of resources [52]. Research design is interpreted 
as an exercise that enables research to be conducted using a reliable methodology that will result in 
answering the research questions and meeting the objectives. 
 Research purpose 
The literature to do with research methods often shows that the research purpose could be classified 
into three categories; descriptive, exploratory and explanatory [53]. These three categories are mostly 
driven by the type of research questions. Answers to research questions could fall into one of these 
categories and/or it could be a combination of two categories meaning, research could have more than 
one purpose. These three types of research purposes are described as follows: 
3.2.1.1 Exploratory research  
Exploratory research aims to answer research questions that are formed from hypothetical or theoretical 
observations. It is useful to lay the groundwork and clarify understanding of the problem. Its great 
advantage is it is flexible and adaptable, as a result the research direction is allowed to change from new 
data and any new insights obtained. 
3.2.1.2 Descriptive research  
Descriptive research attempts to describe, explore and explain existing conditions, events or situations. 
This follows after the groundwork from an exploratory study is established. Descriptive research is 
meant to expand understanding, describe and give information in a detailed manner with the aim to fill 
any missing information and understanding. Descriptive research uses surveys, questionnaires and case 
studies, which can generate evidence on the appropriateness and provide information relative to the 
feasibility of an intervention. 
3.2.1.3 Explanatory research  
Explanatory research is conducted to study a situation or a problem in order to explain the relationship 
between two or more variables. Explanatory research is not meant to give conclusive answers, rather it 
helps to study the problem in more depth and more efficiently. The researcher is expected to adapt to 
new data and any new insights that are discovered.  
Given the research objective and research questions posed for this research, the purpose of the research 
was a combination of both the descriptive and explanatory research methods. This combined research 
purpose is known as descriptor-explanatory [53]. The first research question aimed to describe the 
causes of privacy risks by explaining variables (vulnerabilities and threats) that lead to privacy risks 
during big data analytics. The second research question aimed to describe a privacy risk identification 





used to describe, explore and explain answers of the research questions, based on collected and analysed 
primary and secondary data. The following section describes the research strategy chosen to answer the 
research questions.   
 Research strategy 
There are different strategies that can be used for exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research [54]. 
In [53], there are seven different strategies that could be used, which are; experiment; survey; case 
study; action research; grounded theory; ethnography; and archival research. The decision on the 
research strategy is guided by the research questions and destinations; the degree of existing 
information; measure of time and accessibility to different assets. The research conducted could either 
follow a deductive or inductive research approach. A deductive approach assumes a hypothesis from 
the theory and thereafter, designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis. Inductive research is 
concerned with building theory. The researcher is not prevented from using existing theory to construct 
and answer research questions. Inductive research is formed from experience. It is also possible to have 
a research paper that uses both deductive and inductive research.  
Table 3.1 below gives direction to the potential research design based on the different types of research 
questions and different data collection and analysis techniques (qualitative and quantitative) depending 
on the research focus. The easiest differentiation between the two is a qualitative method, which focuses 
on data collection and analysis that uses or generates non-numeric data (words), while the quantitative 
focuses on numeric data (numbers) [55] 
Table 3.1: Research design vs type of research questions [55] 
Mapping research questions to possible research design 




Possible research focus Possible 
research 
design(s) 






- Measurement and 
frequency distribution of 
key variables of a 
population or phenomenon 
- Description of aggregate 




- Content analysis 
(for text) 
 
- In-depth, thick description 
of a phenomenon and its 
context 
- Lived experience and 
perspective of those 
involved in a particular 
situation 
- Understanding of the 
diversity of a phenomenon 
- Interview study 
- Ethnography 







- Testing of explanatory 
theory 
- Measurement of the 
impact of one variable on 
another 
- Prediction of a dependent 
variable from the value of 
one or more independent 
variables 






- Content analysis  
- Building explanatory 
theory 
- Identification of causal 
mechanisms, process and 
context 
- Understanding of actors’ 
reasoning, values and 
beliefs from their 
perspective 
- Case study 
- Grounded 
theory 
- Action research 





- Testing of process theory 
- Modelling of development 
of phenomena over time 
- Analytic survey 
- Simulations 
- Building process theory 
- Identification of process 
change and development 
-  Analysis of social 
construction of phenomena 

















The research that was conducted sought to answer the following two questions:  
i. What are the privacy vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks during the big data 
analytics phase? (What causes privacy risks?) 
ii. What is the risk identification model that can be used to identify privacy risks during the analytics 
phase? 
 
Research Question 1 is more concerned with looking at vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy 
risks. This research question was descriptive in nature. For it to be answered, it required an in-depth 
qualitative study of a real-world scenario. 
Research Question 2 was more concerned with constructing a privacy risk identification model. This 
research question was descriptive in nature, however, it was different in that it looked at an in-depth 
description of a phenomenon and its context. 
Both research questions were considered to be both descriptive and explanatory because they were 
focused on giving a descriptive answer by explaining the properties of a phenomenon. These two 
research questions used a content analysis qualitative method. Secondary data was collected from 
industry privacy assessment reports, where an in-depth study was done. The content analysis research 
results were used to gauge and answer the research questions, together with the literature review.  
 Secondary data 
Secondary data refers to existing data that is collected for a different purpose. According to [53], there 
are three types of secondary data, namely; documentary, multiple source and survey. This research used 
a documentary type of secondary data. Documentary secondary data is divided into written material 
and non-written material. Secondary data in the form of written material could include previous research 
studies, national or local government records, and private or public sector business organisations. 
Written material in the form of industry related reports was used for this research. There are advantages 
and disadvantages of using secondary data. The advantages include saving time and costs of not having 
to conduct primary research. This avoids conducting repetitive research and sensitive topics like 
privacy, where it is difficult to collect primary data that can be analysed using secondary data. The 
disadvantages include the mismatch between the data collected and answering the research questions, 
where the data collected may be incomplete, inaccurate or obsolete [56].  
The researcher requires a criteria for selecting secondary data and this criteria could include questions 
such as, is the collected data going to answer the research questions; is the collected data large and 
diverse enough; is the collected data aligning with the research strategy [57]? Data collected for 
secondary analysis should be adequate and relevant since the original data was not meant to answer the 
research questions. 
There are also ethical considerations that come with using secondary data. Secondary data available to 
the public or freely available from any other sources can be analysed without permission. However, the 
sources of data must be acknowledged [58]. If data is not freely available, permission to use this data 
should be obtained. 
 Content analysis research 
By definition from [59], content analysis is ‘… the systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and 
symbolic matter, not necessarily from an author’s or user’s perspective’. Other researchers regard 
content analysis as a flexible, systematic method of analysing text data [60], [61]. Content analysis is 
inconspicuous and recognised from different sorts of exploration in that it does not need the assortment 
of information from individuals. Content investigation is an investigation of recorded data, or data, 





strategy for gathering information from a lot of writings, which can be composed, oral or visual; that is 
(a) books, papers and magazines (b) talks and meetings (c) web substance and web-based media posts 
(d) photos and films [59]. 
Content analysis permits both qualitative and quantitative research studies. There are two kinds of 
content analysis; these are a theoretical investigation and social examination. In a theoretical 
investigation, an idea is selected for assessment, and the examination includes evaluating and counting 
its essence. The emphasis is on taking a look at the event of chosen terms inside content. Social 
investigation likewise, starts with the demonstration of recognising ideas present in a given book or set 
of writings. Anyway, social investigation tries to pass the present by investigating the connections 
between the ideas recognised. Social investigation has likewise, been named semantic analysis [60], 
[61], [62]. The researcher must take into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of content analysis 
as detailed below: 
Content analysis strengths: 
i. Content analysis enables close interpretation and analysis of text; 
ii. Content analysis allows deeper insights to be extracted from complex models of content; and 
iii. Content analysis is unobtrusive 
Content analysis weaknesses:  
i. Abstraction and interpretation of content from its context may result in loss of meaning and 
introduce bias [63], 
ii. Content analysis is unable to draw conclusions and provide further explanation of phenomena 
outside of its context or text [64]; and. 
iii. Content analysis may be time consuming if data collected is not yielding to the objective and aims 
of the research [60]. 
3.3 Content analysis process 
Figure 3.1 below shows the phases and steps that should be taken in the research of content analysis.  
 





These phases and steps guide the researcher to conduct research using a qualitative content analysis. 
These phases are mentioned and common in [55], [62], [60], [65], [66] for a qualitative content analysis 
and are as follows:  
i. Data preparation: The data preparation phase includes planning and data collection.   
ii. Building a coding frame: Building a coding frame is formed by selecting material; structuring and 
generating categories; defining categories; revising and expanding the frame. 
iii. Piloting: The piloting phase is a repetition of some of the steps carried out in building a coding 
frame and that is by selecting material; trial coding; evaluating and modifying the coding frame. 
iv. Main analysis: This main analysis is where the researcher summarises the understanding and 
essence of the studied phenomena. In the main analysis phase, all material should be coded as it 
can no longer be modified. The coding frame should have been finalised, be reliable and valid. 
v. Presenting findings - Presenting the findings is self-explanatory, this involves presenting the frame, 
quoting and tracing the analysis. 
 Data reparation 
3.3.1.1 Planning 
The main goal of the content analysis research was to answer the research Questions 1 and 2.  
Answers to Question 1 should be related to the vulnerabilities and threats that cause privacy risk. 
Privacy risk in the literature is defined as harm that is caused by vulnerabilities and threats towards data. 
The answer to the research question should be based on privacy risk during data analytics. Data analytics 
have three stages as illustrated in the literature review in Chapter 2. These stages include certain 
activities that might have data threats and vulnerabilities thus causing privacy risks.  
The three stages in big data analytics are: 
i. Data collection  
ii. Data processing  
iii. Knowledge creation 
Vulnerabilities and threats run across all three stages of big data analytics.  
The answer to this question was based on the content analysis that was conducted on any previous big 
data related privacy risk assessment industry reports. The privacy risk assessment industry reports 
should demonstrate the understanding of the concept of privacy, both from the user, as well as from the 
organisation. The threats and vulnerability answers were from a perspective of both the user and an 
organisation. In the literature it was seen that data threats were seen from the user’s perspective, and 
vulnerabilities were seen from an organisation’s perspective. 
Research Question 2 focused on deducing a risk identification model that could be used to identify 
privacy risks during the analytics phase. A privacy risk identification model was constructed from the 
literature review and was then compared to existing privacy risk models that have been previously 
applied in real life scenarios. The model constructed from the literature that detailed steps with different 
themes were examined against the content of secondary data from industry reports. The results showed 
the similarities and differences, thus making room for analysis and conclusion on the constructed 
privacy risk identification model.   
 
3.3.1.2 Data collection 
Qualitative content analysis research could attract the researcher to a substantial amount of data that 
could be collected. In order to avoid overload, the researcher had to choose only some parts of the data 
to be used. The researcher also had to consider the diversity of the data sources. This helped in building 
a suitable coding frame, reflecting diversified data. The answers to the research Questions 1 and 2 





industry reports on privacy risks that were selected, should be able to answer the research questions. 
All the material collected should cover privacy risk identification.  
This research firstly described the causes of privacy risks and secondly the privacy risk identification 
model, based on the evaluation of derived causes. The privacy risk identification model is derived from 
the causes with a consideration of combining the literature with different risk identification models in 
other sectors. The material collected that was secondary data, was not exactly in the big data analytics 
space but the principles of privacy risk identification would be analysed from reports of similar sectors.  
The researcher should collect data that is easily accessible, and data with maximum potential to answer 
the research questions. Data collected should at least have covered the following types of data for the 
research questions to be answered.  
i. The study of the privacy risk assessment standard and methodology in a real-world scenario. 
ii. The study of what was considered to identify privacy risk in a real-world scenario. 
iii. The study of a model that was followed to identify privacy risk in a real-world scenario. 
The following criteria were considered to ensure that the data collected had relevant data based on the 
above types. 
i. The privacy risk threats and vulnerabilities should be clear as to how they have been incorporated. 
ii. The privacy risk identification process should be clear as to how it was followed.   
iii. The privacy risk identification process should have results and the standard/model followed. 
 Building a coding frame 
3.3.2.1 Selecting material 
The researcher had to consider the governing procedure on how secondary data would be collected. The 
challenge with secondary data is that the collected data could be for a different purpose. The original 
data purpose may not completely complement the researcher’s objectives. The research considered the 
use of multiple industry reports that were evident, as detailed below:  
3.3.2.1.1 Use of multiple industry reports 
The researcher considered using at least three or more privacy risk industry reports. The source of data 
needed to be in the following form:  
i. Detailed documentation of a real-world scenarios where privacy risks are analysed in detail showing 
how they were constructed. Documentation can be reviewed by the researcher repeatedly.  
ii. Different real-world scenarios that will show the consistency and inconsistency of the privacy risk 
identification model. This will also ensure that there is no biased view from the research on the 
privacy risk identification model. 
3.3.2.1.2 Evidence 
The researcher considered reliable sources of secondary data that yielded valid findings of the research. 
The researcher considered the following: 
i. Secondary data collected was current, reliable and extracted from real world scenarios. 
ii. Secondary data collected was available and located easily for visibility. 
iii. Costs and benefits of data collected was analysed with a view in mind that data collected might not 







3.3.2.1.3 Material selected for content analysis 
Table 3.2 below details the industry reports that were selected from the secondary data available 
publicly from the sources or hyperlinks shown:  
Table 3.2: Material selected for content analysis 
Privacy risk 
name 










A high-level review of this report reflected that it 
would be able to provide answers for the research 
Questions 1and 2. The real-world project that was 
assessed was the proposal of linking data collected for 
different purposes to benefit the Australian 
government on making informed decisions. The report 
showed the analysis of privacy risks that was caused 
by data collection, processing of data and use of data. 
This portion of the report mainly answered research 
Question 1. Research Question 2 was answered by the 
privacy risk identification model used where a risk 


























The real-world project assessed, from a privacy point 
of view in this report, was consumer data right. A 
consumer data right project is for individuals to access 
data relating to them, held by business organisations 
and using that data to benefit themselves. The report 
analysed the privacy risk considering the threats and 
vulnerabilities when this data was processed by the 
organisation, collected by the consumer and possibly 
shared to another organisation to benefit the consumer. 
This report has a detailed analysis of all the threats and 
vulnerabilities leading to a privacy risk, which makes 
it suitable to answer research Question 1. 
Additionally, it details the process taken to identify a 
privacy risk and assigning a risk level considering the 













Table 3.2: Material selected for content analysis (continued) 
Draft 
communicatio
ns data bill 
privacy impact 
assessment 
This report was seen fit to answer research Question 
1. Research Question 2 did not seem to be answered 
by this report, even though scrutinised, it gave a view 
on a privacy risk identification model. The project 
being assessed was the legislation proposed to 
communication service providers and internet service 
providers, to store all communication transactions in 
case they were needed by government for crime 
investigations. The privacy risk assessment analysed 
and identified privacy risk caused by threats and 
vulnerabilities. It continued to suggest safeguards to 















This report was for a project called Smart Metering, 
which enabled an energy supply economy to be 
improved by Government. On a high-level review, the 
report showed that it would answer research Question 
1. The report reflected the analysis of privacy risk with 
regards to activities that could be performed upon 
collecting, processing and using data. Research 
Question 2 could be answered upon the scrutiny of the 
report. The report did not clearly indicate the process 













3.3.2.2 Structuring and generating 
The researcher had to structure and generate data when building the decoding frame. Structuring is 
where the researcher had to create main categories; generating has to do with creating subcategories for 
each main category. There were two ways, which could be considered by the researcher when 
structuring and generating. These steps were carried out in a concept driven or data driven way. A 
concept driven way bases the categories on prior research, and data driven way bases categories on what 
is being encountered on reading the material. The researcher used both, due to the concept driven way 
may omit other material because it was never accounted for. The main categories were created in a 
concept driven way and the subcategories were created in a data driven way.  
The following were the pre-defined categories in a concept driven way for research Questions 1and 2:  
Research Question 1 categories: 
i. Data privacy vulnerability 
ii. Data privacy threats 
Research Question 2 categories:  
i. Privacy risk model 
ii. Privacy risk evaluation 
iii. Privacy risk identification 
The content analysis of secondary data focused on Table 3.3 phenomena check list detailed below. The 
phenomena checklist was taken from the literature review to answer the research questions. The 
phenomena check list of research Question 1 was a replication of vulnerabilities and threats in Table 
2.2. The phenomena check list of research Question 2 was derived from Figure 2.5. Analysing 
secondary data in a form of content analysis, would show the differences between the conceptual 





Table 3.3: Content analysis check list 
Research questions  Categories (Pre-defined) Phenomenon check list 
Research Question 1 Data privacy vulnerability Data owner consent 
Data security 
Data integrity 
Data computational methods 
Data analytic processing tool 
Access control 
Education 
Data privacy threats Organisations with access to data  
External parties with access to data  
Research Question 2 Privacy risk standard or methodology Risk standard or methodology used 
Privacy risk evaluation Privacy risk likelihood 
Privacy risk consequence 
Privacy risk identification Privacy risk level 
 
There are different strategies to be considered when creating structuring and generating in a data driven 
way [71]. Subsumption and progressive summarising are the most important strategies. Subsumption is 
used to derive subcategories once the main categories have been derived. The researcher used 
subsumption to derive the subcategories.  
3.3.2.3 Defining categories 
The researcher started defining categories once the structure of the coding frame was created. Defining 
categories included having a category name, description of the category, and decision rules. The 
description of a category could have a definition, which was the mandatory part and an indicator. 
Indicators could be specific words or descriptions that will point out a phenomenon.  
3.3.2.4 Revising and expanding 
In this step, the researcher had to revise all categories generated and defined, to make sure it was done 
properly. The researcher found that some categories were similar and needed to merge, or some 
categories needed to clearly be defined due to the concepts being different. This could result in the 
whole structure being revised. The revision of the structure might result in a coding frame being 
expanded where additional main or subcategories are added to the structure. This could be a repetitive 
process as more material is covered.  
3.3.2.5 Segmentation 
In segmentation, data is divided into units. The researcher had to fit each unit into one subcategory of 
the coding frame. Coding units were the interpretation of the subcategories and they varied in size. The 
coding unit could be the interpretation of a word or paragraph.  
 Piloting 
3.3.3.1 Selecting material 
Once the coding frame was developed, the researcher considered repeating the process by piloting the 
selected material. The researcher followed the same procedure, as described above, of how to select the 
material.  
3.3.3.2 Trial coding 
Trial coding involved applying categories from the coding frame to the material. This was done by 





document where coding units are rows and main categories are columns. The subcategories were 
entered into cells.  
3.3.3.3 Evaluating and modifying the coding frame 
The researcher evaluated the coding frame by thoroughly examining the results of trial coding focusing 
on consistency and validity. The researcher checked if there was consistency in the coding frame. The 
researcher should have made sure the categories described the material and the concepts to answer the 
research question. The researcher was allowed to modify the coding frame if the coding was 
inconsistent.  
 Main analysis 
This was the main analysis where the researcher summarised the understanding and essence of the 
studied phenomenon. In the main analysis phase, all material was coded as it could no longer be 
modified. The coding frame was finalised, reliable and valid. 
 Presenting and interpreting the findings 
The researcher presented the findings of the content analysis with the objective of answering the 
research questions. There findings on research Question 1 were based on threats and vulnerabilities 
causing privacy risks. The findings of research Questions 2 were based on the privacy risk identification 
model compared to the model derived from the literature.  
3.4 Reliability and validity 
The reliability and validity of secondary data was determined by the method by which the data was 
collected and the sources of the data. The data collected from well-known organisations was considered 
to be credible, reliable and trustworthy and of high reliability. However, assessing the validity of 
documentary material could be challenging. Data collected from organisations could be inaccurate. In 
this case the method by which data was collected became of the utmost importance to determine 
validity. According to [72], in order to validate the available secondary data collected that was available 
on the internet, it was important to identify the author, which made it easier to assess the reliability of 
the source. This was done by checking the copyright to assist in validating data. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The research methodology discussed in this chapter presented how the research was conducted. The 
research methodology was based on the research design that was driven by two research questions. The 
research design presented the research purpose and strategy with reasons why the secondary data 
collection technique and content analysis method were used to conduct the research. The process of 
conducting research using the content analysis method, based on secondary data, was explained. The 





4 CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS and RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of this research paper presents the process and findings of the qualitative content analysis 
conducted on the data collected. A systematic content analysis method of data collection and analysis 
was followed to answer two research questions. Data collected was in the form of industry project 
reports and catered to answer both research questions. The content analysis process that was followed 
was presented. Research questions were analysed separately using the same data collected, following 
the same content analysis process. Research Question 1 refers to privacy vulnerabilities and threats, 
while research Question 2 refers to the privacy risk identification model. Following the content analysis 
process, categories were defined, based on the literature conducted for both research questions and the 
content was segmented accordingly. Piloting was conducted where some steps of the process were 
repeated to recognise any shortcomings of the coding frame. Results are presented and the analysis was 
conducted for each research question where the findings are discussed.  
4.2 Content analysis process 
The objective of the research was to identify the cause of privacy risks during big data analytics 
operations and thereafter, construct privacy risk identification model to assist in managing privacy risks. 
For organisations to be able to manage privacy risks, there needs to be an identification, root cause and 
assessment of privacy risks.   
The research conducted sought to answer the following two questions:  
i. What are the privacy vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks during big data analytics 
phase? (What causes privacy risks?). 
ii. What is the risk identification model that can be used to identify privacy risks during the analytics 
phase? 
 
This first part of the research focused on research Question 1, which was to answer what were the 
privacy vulnerabilities and threats that cause privacy risks. Secondary data was collected about industry 
documented project reports to answer this research question. The content analysis research results were 
used to gauge and answer the research questions, together with the literature review.  
The process that was followed to analyse the content of the data collected, is shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
The process was introduced in Chapter 3. This chapter reflects the execution of the process, which was 
based on the data collected in the form of project reports. The context of the content analysis to answer 
research Questions 1 and 2 was different. Research Question 1 focused on the threats and vulnerabilities, 
while research Question 2 focused on the privacy risk identification model. These research questions 
were closely related as shown in the literature review. Due to that, they have a different context; the 







Figure 4.1: Content analysis process 
4.3 Privacy vulnerabilities and threats content analysis 
4.3.1 Building the coding frame 
Building a coding frame is part of defining categories; revising and expanding the frame and 
segmentation. The categories related to vulnerabilities and threats were defined based on the literature 
review. The categories were revised to make sure they were fit for the content analysed. Content was 
thereafter segmented in a form of coding that fits into different categories. 
4.3.1.1 Defining categories 
The research method chosen for this research was content analysis. The content analysis research 
process, as described in Chapter 3, was the planning, data collection and material selected for content 
analysis. Content was analysed based on Table 2.10 below, to answer research Question 1. The content 
of four industry project reports was analysed. The content analysis was done with a view to find privacy 
vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks.  








Data owner consent Data collected, processed and used without data 
owner approval 
Data integrity Data free of errors, up to date, acquired from 
trusted sources and surety of data not being 
modified by unauthorised subjects. Data being 
used for the purpose was collected.  
Data computational 
methods 
Data integrated, aggregated and represented in 
different forms using computational methods 
Data analytic 
processing tool 
Operations on data normally executed using a 
computer tool to retrieve, transform, or classify 
information for interpretation 
Access control Selective access of people that were permitted to 
view and access data at different levels 






Table 4.1: Vulnerabilities and threats content analysis criteria (continued) 
 
Education Knowledge and learning that is created 
from data analytics 
Data privacy threats Organisations with access to data  Internal organisation of data holder 
External parties with access to data  External organisation that is not a data 
holder 
 
4.3.1.2 Revising and expanding the frame 
All categories generated and defined were revised to make sure they had been correctly generated and 
defined. There were no categories that needed to be merged nor clearly defined, due to any ambiguity. 
The structure of the content analysis process did not change, resulting in the coding frame not being 
expanded or shrunk.  
4.3.1.3 Segmentation 
A coding spreadsheet was used to record all activities based on the categories and phenomena 
definitions in Table 2.10 above. Industry project reports were analysed with a view to capture all the 
privacy vulnerabilities and threats based on the literature review. The content of industry project reports 
was analysed based on different real-world scenarios, where privacy risks, vulnerabilities and threats 
were analysed. In each project report, electronic sticky notes were used to mark vulnerabilities and 
threats that were recognised, and the results were captured in the coding spreadsheet. The coding 
document presented content, coded in rows, and the main categories, together with phenomena in 
columns. The researcher used a count to reflect the number of instances of each code associated with 
the defined phenomena check. Segmentation results on each project report are presented in Appendix 
A, B, C and D. The context of projects from each report are summarised in Table 4.2 below.  
Table 4.2: Vulnerabilities and threats industry report context 
Privacy risk report name Context of the report 
Privacy impact assessment 
on the linkage of address 
register with census 
data/contact data 
The real-world project being assessed was the proposal of linking data collected 
for different purposes to benefit the Australian government to make informed 
decisions. The report showed the analysis of privacy risks that were caused by 
data collection, processing of data and the use of data. This portion of the report 
answered mainly research Question 1. 
Consumer data right The real-world project being assessed from the privacy point of view in this 
report, was consumer data right. A consumer data right project was for 
individuals to access data related to them held by business organisations and 
using that data to benefit themselves. The report analyses of the privacy risk 
considered the threats and vulnerabilities when this data was processed by the 
organisation, collected by the consumer and possibly shared to another 
organisation to benefit the consumer. This report had a detailed analysis of all 
the threats and vulnerabilities leading to privacy risk which made it suitable to 
answer research Question 1. 
Draft communications data 
bill privacy impact 
assessment 
The project being assessed was the legislation proposed to both communication 
and internet service providers to store all communications transactions in case 
they were needed by government for crime investigations. The privacy risk 
assessment analysed and identified privacy risk caused by threats and 




This report was for a project called Smart Metering, which would enable the 
energy supply economy to be improved by Government. The report reflected 
the analysis of privacy risk with regards to activities that could be performed 







4.3.2.1 Selecting material 
The process of selecting the material detailed in Chapter 3, was reviewed and repeated. Material selected 
was in the form of four multiple industry project reports. These project reports contained different real-
world scenarios where privacy risks were analysed in detail, showing how they were constructed. 
Different real-world scenario cases showed the consistency and inconsistency of the privacy risks 
models. Secondary data collected was considered current, reliable and could be located easily, as 
described in Table 3.2. 
4.3.2.2 Trial coding 
Trial coding involves applying categories from the coding frame to the material. This was done by 
following the same procedure as described in the segmentation process that was followed. Upon trial 
coding, content that represented more than one category was categorised and counted against a related 
phenomenon, taking into consideration the context. The final results are presented in Appendix A, B, 
C and D, based on each project report.  
4.3.2.3 Evaluation and modifying the coding frame 
The researcher evaluated the coding frame by thoroughly examining the results of trial coding, focusing 
on consistency and validity. Upon piloting, an additional phenomenon was identified. Piloting was 
conducted in a form of repeating the process of building the coding framework. The additional 
phenomenon identified was governance. This phenomenon was identified under the data privacy 
vulnerability category. Governance covers the processes and procedures taken in the three stages of 
data analytics.   
4.3.3 Main analysis 
The analyses of the project reports in this research were performed using 9 phenomena checklist factors 
shown in Table 4.1. Additionally, a phenomenon factor of governance was added upon evaluation and 
modification of the coding frame. That is, 10 phenomena checklist factors as shown in the second row 
of Table 4.3. A total of 146 instances were identified from 10 phenomena checklist factors in each 
project report as shown in Table 4.3. The top 3 of the identified instances fell into the phenomenon of 
data integrity, followed by data owner consent and data security. The smart metering report recorded 
the highest occurrence of instances, followed by the consumer data right report.  
Table 4.3: Vulnerabilities and threats content analysis results 
 






















































































































































Smart metering implementation 
programme 
11 9 3 5 17 19 2 3 0 7 
Privacy impact assessment on the linkage 
of address register with census 
data/contact data 
4 5 1 1 0 5 1 0 0 1 
Draft communications data bill privacy 
impact assessment 






Table 4.3: Vulnerabilities and threats content analysis results (continued) 
Consumer data right 15 20 0 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 
Totals 31 37 4 8 22 28 4 3 0 9 
 
Figure 4.2 below is the graphical representation of all instances recorded of each phenomenon identified 
from the literature review.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Vulnerabilities and threats content analysis coding results 
4.3.4 Discussion of findings 
4.3.4.1 Data owner consent 
There were 31 identified instances of data owner consent across all the reports analysed. In all reports 
there was at least one instance of data owner consent. The highest occurrence was identified in the 
consumer data right report, followed by smart metering, linking of address register and lastly, data bill 
report. 
In the literature review in Chapter 2, data owner consent was identified at the step of data collection, 
based on big data analytics operational steps. According to the literature review, it is at this step of the 
process, where the data owner’s consent should be obtained. The data owner should give consent to the 
data collection purpose and how it will be used. In the presence of a threat, data collected and used 
without an owner’s consent, creates a vulnerability, thus causing a privacy risk.   
Instances identified under data owner consent in Appendix A, B, C, and D, showed the same concept 
of data owner consent. In Appendix A, it was mentioned in one instance that ‘There is a perception that 
data could be collected and used without the individual’s knowledge, or…’ this statement makes it 
clearly evident that consent should be given at the point of data collection. There are also instances 
identified that refer to the data collection purpose and how it will be used. This is evident in Appendix 
A, ‘… it is important that consumers are clear about what is involved’ and Appendix B ‘… to take 
reasonable steps to ensure the individual is aware of the fact, circumstances and the purposes of 
collection’.  
It was also clear that data collected for a specific purpose but later used for a different purpose, without 
data owner consent, creates a vulnerability that causes privacy risk. This is evident in Appendix A ‘… 
require that suppliers must receive explicit (opt-in) consent from the customer in order to access half-
hourly energy consumption data, or to use energy consumption data for marketing purposes’. If there 
is a scope change on purpose and a change of how data is processed, the data owner should give another 





is evident in Appendix B, ‘… participants indicated that they expected the ability to opt out of the 
process’. Additionally, if data is to be shared with third parties that were not specified at the initial 
consent, new consent of sharing data should be given. This is specified indirectly in Appendix D, ‘A 
third party may access the accredited data recipient’s systems and acquire or use an individual’s data 
without authorisation’. 
Based on the content analysed, it is evident that data owner consent is a vulnerability that causes privacy 
risk. In order to minimise privacy risk, data owner consent should be obtained for direct or indirect data 
collection, processing of data collected, and sharing of data collected with the third parties. 
Additionally, if there were any scope changes from the initial consent, a new consent should be obtained 
from the data owner. New knowledge is being added from the content analysed, data owner consent 
also needs to be catered for during the step of data processing and knowledge created.  
4.3.4.2 Data integrity 
There were 37 instances of data integrity identified across all the reports. Data integrity has the highest 
record of occurrences in all vulnerabilities across all reports. In all reports there was at least one instance 
of data integrity identified. The highest occurrence was identified on the consumer data right report, 
followed by smart metering, linkage of address register and lastly, the data bill report. 
In the literature review provided in Chapter 2, data integrity was identified as a vulnerability, often 
realised when data is collected. Data integrity refers to data protection from unauthorised modification 
following a data security perspective. Data integrity was also generalised as data trustworthy, which 
refers to data being free of errors, up to date, acquired from trusted sources and not modified by 
unauthorised parties. It also looked at data being used for the intended purpose. Data collected should 
be accurate, complete, applicable to the timelines and not excessive above what it is required for. If 
these principles of data integrity are not considered and taken care of, data collected and processed 
creates a vulnerability that causes privacy risks. 
It is evident that data integrity principles identified in the literature were also seen to be mentioned in 
identified instances from the reports. Excessive information and purpose principles were evident in 
Appendix A, ‘Privacy and consumer stakeholders have also put forward the argument that where 
larger volumes of data are collected than are required for a particular purpose’. The accuracy of data 
collected was another data integrity principle evident in Appendix B. ‘As mentioned, generally indirect 
collection of personal information increases privacy risk, as individuals have less control over the 
accuracy or otherwise of their personal information’. There is another principle of data being applicable 
to the timelines, which was evident in Appendix C, ‘There is a risk that as equipment is decommissioned 
and retention periods expires, data is not properly destroyed leading to a breach of the …’. Data 
integrity also looked at data that is not modified by unauthorised parties and this is evident in Appendix 
D, ‘A third party may intercept or interfere with the data during transfer between the data holder and 
the accredited data recipient’. 
4.3.4.3 Data computational methods 
There were 4 identified instances of data computational methods across all the reports analysed. In 2 
reports there was at least one instance of education identified. The data bill and consumer data right 
report did not have an instance of data computational methods. The highest occurrence was identified 
in the smart metering report, followed by the linkage of address register report.  
In the literature review in Chapter 2, computational methods were used in the process of extraction, 
cleaning and annotation. The computational methods used to extract and clean information may 
consider other data collected as important and others discarded. This was the reason why data 
computational methods were considered as privacy vulnerabilities, as they posed a privacy risk. 
It is evident that a computational method could be one of the vulnerabilities that needs to be considered 





to be mentioned in identified instances from the reports. Appendix A referred to an instance where there 
was a requirement to restrict access to data flags, of which a computational method should take care of 
the processing of data, ‘In addition there is a requirement for “restrict access to data flags‟ in the data 
store to prevent access to data that has been generated, for example, by a previous tenant’. Appendix 
B also showed an instance of where data could be almost identical and the computational method should 
be able to detect and not discard important information, ‘This is especially the case when addresses 
from the two sources (Census and the Address Register) are largely identical in content and 
representation, not to mention that Census addresses also play an important role in the linking process’.  
4.3.4.4 Data analytic processing tool 
There were 8 identified instances of data analytic processing tools across all reports analysed. In all the 
reports there was at least one instance of data security identified. The highest occurrence was identified 
on the smart metering report, followed by the linking of the address register, together with the data bill 
report and consumer data right report.  
The literature review presented in Chapter 2, referred to a data analytic processing tool as an instrument 
used in data integration, aggregation and represenation. The data analytic processing tool integrating, 
aggregating and representing data could become a privacy vulnerability if the measures to make sure 
data was not incorrectly integrated and represented were not in place. 
Instances identified under a data analytic processing tool in Appendix A, B, C, and D show the same 
concept of a data analytic processing tool. In Appendix C, it was clearly evident that data represented 
incorrectly could lead to false information being returned, ‘An error (such as incorrect transcription of 
a phone number) may occur at the CSP leading to the return of incorrect data’. In Appendix D, one 
instance referred to dataset aggregation as a privacy concern, ‘The individual may experience increased 
threats to privacy due to improved insights about the individual enabled by analytics and better access 
to aggregated datasets’. Appendix A also referred to consistency in approach when processing data ‘… 
by specifying that parties using data provide appropriate information to their customers about this 
processing and by ensuring consistency in approach’. 
4.3.4.5 Access control 
There were 22 identified instances of access control across all the reports analysed. In 3 reports there 
was at least 1 instance of access control identified. Only the linkage of the address register report did 
not have an instance of access control. The highest occurrence was identified in the smart metering 
report, followed by consumer data right and lastly, data bill report.  
In the literature review, it reflects that access control works hand-in-hand with data security. Access 
control refers to levels of access based on access rights. Access control was identified during the step 
of knowledge creation, where data has been processed and was ready to be used as information. Access 
to knowledge created from data analytics should be managed by strong access control systems. In order 
to protect privacy, the system should have restrictions to access data, such that the system should be 
able to anonymise data fields so that individual records cannot be pinpointed. Considering that there 
were no measures of access control, data was vulnerable to internal or external threats and privacy 
would be at risk. 
It is evident that access control is one of the important vulnerabilities that needs to be considered to 
minimise privacy risks. Access control principles identified in the literature are also seen to be 
mentioned in identified instances from the reports. Appendix A reflects an instance of access control 
based on security, ‘The Government has included a security capability in the Smart Metering Equipment 
Technical Specifications (SMETS) to restrict access to data’. Appendix D reflects an instance where an 
internal person can be a threat by viewing information without authorisation, which refers to one of the 
principles of anonymising data fields, ’The accredited data recipient, their employee or contractor may 





4.3.4.6 Data security 
There were 28 identified instances of data security across all the reports analysed. In all reports there 
was at least one instance of data security identified. The highest occurrence was identified in the smart 
metering report, followed by the linking of the address register and lastly the data bill report together 
with the consumer data right report.  
In the literature review in Chapter 2, data security refers to data protection from unauthorised accesses, 
unauthorised data modifications and availability to unauthorised users. Given a threat, data security is 
critical to minimise privacy risks. If data security is not ensured, data becomes vulnerable, thus causing 
privacy risks. Data security is mostly evident in data collection and knowledge creation in the steps of 
big data analytics.  
It was evident that data security is one of the critical vulnerabilities that needs to be considered to 
minimise privacy risks. Data security principles identified in the literature, were also seen to be 
mentioned in identified instances from the reports. Appendix A referred to an instance of security breach 
that could lead to unauthorised access, ‘… could be compromised through a breach in security allowing 
unlawful / unauthorised access’. Appendix B referred to an instance of tighter security measures for 
stored data, ‘The longer the personal information is held by ABS, the more protection, storage and 
security controls that need to be in place’. Appendix C also referred to the breach of security by third 
party threats, ‘There is a risk that through a breach of security, communications data held by CSPs 
could be obtained by an unauthorised third part’.  
4.3.4.7 Education 
There were 4 identified instances of education across all the reports analysed. In 3 reports, there was at 
least one instance of education identified. Only the consumer data right report did not have an instance 
of education. The highest occurrence was identified in the smart metering report, followed by the 
linkage of address register, together with the data bill report.  
In the literature review conducted in Chapter 2, education was referred to as the learnings that are 
realised from the knowledge created based on the data analytics conducted. Learnings create a 
vulnerability to data if the benefits are to be utilised by internal or external threats, thus causing privacy 
risk. 
It is evident that education could be one of the vulnerabilities that needs to be considered to minimise 
privacy risks. Education principles identified in the literature were also seen to be mentioned in 
identified instances from the reports. Appendix A referred to an instance where a consumer’s lifestyle 
and patterns of behaviour could be identified, ‘Stakeholder groups have advised that some consumers 
believe that there are risks to their privacy relating to the processing of data and that such data could 
be used to identify their lifestyle and patterns of behaviour’. Appendix B also showed an instance of 
discrimination based on the knowledge created, ‘… there is potential for the proposed linkages to be 
criticised by the community, the media or privacy advocates. Criticisms may also arise because the 
process of the proposed linkages is misunderstood or misrepresented’.  
4.3.4.8 Governance 
There were 3 identified instances of governance across all the reports analysed. These 3 instances were 
only identified in one report, which was the smart metering report. This phenomenon was not part of 
the pre-defined phenomenon but it was identified to fall under the data privacy vulnerability predefined 
category. 
According to the literature review conducted, this phenomenon is not explicitly identified. This 
phenomenon speaks to the governance regarding the handling and use of data across all data analytics 
steps of the process. It is critical that there was a formal way of how things were to be done. This also 
extended to the legal entities and acts that were governing privacy, and set rules on how data was to be 





with regards to data privacy. Organisation operations are guided by laws and regulations that require 
compliance. Organisations are then enforced to identify, assess and manage risks that may result in non-
compliance. Data protection laws rely on risk management as a tool to assess compliance. The legal 
obligations to manage risk of data processing as part of compliance with data protection is driven by 
different entities, and to name a few would be Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [18], United States 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) et cetera. 
Organisations use PIA as part of risk management for data protection. In practice, the US Federal 
government agencies, UK Information Commission office, and the Treasury Board of Canada conduct 
PIA as a mandatory minimum measure of data protection. The PIAs are meant to consider both harms 
and benefits and explicitly balance them out. 
This phenomenon was evident in Appendix A, where it reflected the role of government with regards 
to how data should be handled and used, ‘For example, the Government will require that suppliers and 
third parties should provide reminders to consumers about the data that they are accessing, and how 
consumers can change the arrangements if they wish to. In this way consumers can continue to control 
the choices they make’. Other rules on how data should be handled were not clearly defined as some of 
the rules are not yet published. Appendix A showed a coded instance of this type ‘However, the 
Government has not yet decided on precisely how this should work in practise, such as whether the CIN 
approach should be purely optional, as one way for third parties to verify the individual, or whether it 
should be mandatory’. 
4.3.4.9 Organisations with access to data 
There were zero instances identified across all the reports analysed for this phenomenon. From the 
literature review conducted, this phenomenon was identified to fall within the data privacy threats 
category. This phenomenon refers to the organisation that initially collected data and generated data 
using data analytics or an organisation that was granted access to data. The organisation with access to 
data becomes a threat if there was no governance, rules and protocols regarding the use of the data. The 
organisation with access to data, could be a threat and cause privacy risk, given there is a privacy 
vulnerability, especially in the area of governance regarding the use of data. 
4.3.4.10 External parties with access to data 
There were 9 identified instances of external parties with access to data across all the reports analysed. 
In 3 reports, there was at least one instance identified. Only the consumer data right report did not have 
an instance of this phenomenon. The highest occurrence was identified in the smart metering report, 
followed by the linkage of the address register together with the data bill report.  
According to the literature review, external parties that somehow gained access to data without being 
permitted, were the main threats of privacy risks. External parties were able to access data without 
permission to do so, provided there were vulnerabilities to access the data, especially access control and 
data security vulnerabilities. Threat events are directly or indirectly initiated by external parties if the 
vulnerabilities are not taken care of by the organisation that holds the data.  
Qualitative coding also reflected the same concept of external parties, being the threats to privacy. 
External parties become the threat to privacy as seen in Appendix A, B and C. Appendix A reflected 7 
instances while B and C only reflected 1. Appendix A coding reflected this phenomenon as third parties, 
and stated that the third party should be given access, ‘Only the consumer will be able to see this near 
real-time data, unless they have authorised another party to access that data’. This phenomenon also 
extended to the process of law enforcement agencies gaining access to data ‘Some stakeholders have 
raised questions about the potential use of smart metering energy consumption data by law enforcement 
agencies, local authorities and central Government departments, and about the extent to which this 
would impact on consumers’ privacy’. Appendix C also reflected that this phenomenon creates privacy 
risk if the external parties gain access to the data, ‘There is a risk that through a breach of security, 





4.3.5 Summary of the research findings  
Table 4.4 below is the summary of the research findings compared with the literature review. The 
researcher summarises the research findings based on the data privacy notion, phenomena features and 
where phenomena are reflected on big data analytics steps. 
Table 4.4: Summary of the research findings 





 Research findings reflected same data privacy considerations as in 
the literature review. Data owner consent is data privacy 
vulnerability that could cause privacy risks. 
 Data owner consent attributes (purpose, use and sharing of data) 
considered when giving consent, were reflected as being the same 
in both the research findings and the literature review. 
 Literature review reflects data owner consent to be at a stage of 
data collection, while the research findings reflect data owner 
consent to be at the stage of data collection, data processing and 
knowledge creation. 
Data integrity  Research findings reflected the same data privacy notion as in the 
literature review. Data integrity is data privacy vulnerability that 
could cause privacy risks. 
 Data integrity attributes (data trustworthy, purpose, accuracy, 
timelines, excessive, modification) considered when giving 
consent were reflected to be the same in both the research findings 
and the literature review. 
 Literature review reflected data integrity to be at the stage of data 
collection, while research findings reflected data integrity to be at 




 Research findings reflected the same data privacy considerations 
as in the literature review. Data computational methods were 
considered to be data privacy vulnerability that could cause 
privacy risks. 
 Data computational methods were used in the process of 
extraction, cleaning and annotation. This reflected as the same in 
both the research findings and the literature. 
 Literature review reflected data computational methods to be at the 
stage of data processing, and the research findings also showed 













 Research findings reflected the same data privacy considerations as in 
the literature review. Data analytic processing tool was considered to 
be data privacy vulnerability that could cause privacy risks. 
 Data analytic processing tool used in data integration, aggregation and 
representation. This reflected as the same in both the research findings 





 Literature review reflected data analytic processing tool to be at the 
stage of data processing, and the research findings also showed 
instances of data analytic processing tool during the data processing 
stage. 
Access control  Research findings reflected the same data privacy notion as in the 
literature review. Access control is data privacy vulnerability that 
could cause privacy risks. 
 Access control works hand-in-hand with data security. It is mostly 
considered to be a security measure protecting information from 
unauthorised access. This was reflected as the same in both the 
research findings and the literature review. 
 Literature review reflected access control to be at the stage of data 
knowledge creation, and the research findings also showed instances 
of access control during the knowledge creation stage. 
Data security  Research findings reflected the same data privacy considerations as in 
the literature review. Data security is data privacy vulnerability that 
could cause privacy risks. 
 Data security refers to data protection from unauthorised access, 
unauthorised data modifications and availability to unauthorised 
users. This is reflected as the same in both the research findings and 
the literature review. 
 Literature review reflected data security to be at the stage of data 
collection and knowledge creation, while research findings reflect 
data owner consent to be at a stage of data collection, data processing 
and knowledge creation. 
Education  Research findings reflected the same data privacy considerations as in 
the literature review. Education is data privacy vulnerability that 
could cause privacy risks. 
 Education refers to the learnings that are created from data processing 
using data analytics. This is reflected to be the same in both the 
research findings and the literature review. 
 Literature review reflects education to be at the stage of data 
knowledge creation, and the research findings also show instances of 
education during the knowledge creation stage. 
Governance  Governance is the new phenomenon identified under data privacy 
vulnerabilities based on the research findings. Governance was not 
identified in the literature review. Based on the research findings, 
governance is now considered as data privacy vulnerability that could 
cause privacy risks.   
 Governance refers to handling and the use of data. It extends to legal 
entities, acts and sets rules on how data is to be handled to protect data 
owners from privacy risks.  
 Research findings reflected governance to be across all stages, that is 









access to data  
 Research findings did not reflect any instances of this data privacy 
threat as reflected in the literature review.  
 Literature review referred to this threat as an internal threat within the 
organisation that has access to data.  
 Literature review reflected this threat to be across all stages, that is data 
collection, data processing and knowledge creation. Research findings 






with access to data  
 Research findings reflected the same data privacy considerations as in 
the literature review. External parties with access to data are considered 
to be the main threats to data privacy and could cause privacy risks. 
 External parties with access to data are referred to as threats to data 
privacy. These parties gain access to data by intrusion on data privacy 
vulnerabilities. These threats are reflected as the same in both the 
research findings and the literature review. 
 Literature review reflected threats to be across all stages, that is data 
collection, data processing and knowledge creation. Research findings 
also showed instances of this threat to be across all stages of big data 
analytics. 
4.4 Privacy risk identification model content analysis 
4.4.1 Building the coding frame 
Building a coding frame is part of defining categories; revising and expanding the frame and 
segmentation. The categories related to vulnerabilities and threats were defined based on the literature 
review. The categories were revised to make sure they were fit for the content analysed. Content was 
thereafter segmented in a form of coding that fits into different categories. 
4.4.1.1 Defining categories 
The researcher defined the categories once the structure of the coding frame was created. Defining 
categories included having a category name, description of the category, and phenomena. The 
description of a category could have a definition, which is the mandatory part, and an indicator. 
Indicators could be specific words or a description that will point out a phenomenon. The categories for 
privacy risk identification model were defined as follows on Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Privacy risk identification model category definition 
Category  Phenomenon check list Definition 
Privacy risk standard or 
methodology 
Risk standard or 
methodology used 
Risk standard or methodology is a form of 
guidance provided from an established 
standard to assess risk 
Privacy risk evaluation Privacy risk likelihood Privacy risk likelihood is a probability of 
a privacy threat likely to cause harm given 
a privacy vulnerability 
Privacy risk 
consequence 
Privacy risk consequence is the risk 
identified from a threat event and the 
impact it could present  
Privacy risk identification Privacy risk level Privacy risk level is the gauge of the risk 
presented by a combination of the privacy 
risk likelihood and consequence 
 
4.4.1.2 Revising and expanding the frame 
All categories generated and defined were revised to make sure they were properly generated and 
defined. There were no categories that needed to be merged and clearly defined due to any ambiguity. 
The structure of the content analysis process did not change, resulting in the coding frame not being 
expanded or shrunk.  
4.4.1.3 Segmentation 
A coding spreadsheet was used to record all the activities based on the categories and phenomena 
definitions from Table 2.14 above. Industry reports were analysed with a view to capture all the privacy 
risk identification components based on the literature review. The content of the industry reports was 
analysed, based on different real-world scenarios, where privacy risks were identified. In each report, 





recognised; the results were captured in the coding spreadsheet. The coding document presents content 
coded in rows and main categories, together with the phenomena in columns. The researcher used a 
count to reflect the number of instances of each code associated with the phenomena check defined. 
The count is a reflection on instances identified and not necessarily a driver, due to that, this was 
qualitative research. The segmentation results of each report were presented in Appendices E, F, G and 
H.  
4.4.2 Piloting 
4.4.2.1 Selecting material 
The process of selecting the material detailed in Chapter 3, was reviewed and repeated. Material selected 
was in the form of 4 multiple industry reports. These reports were of a different real-world scenario, 
where privacy risks were analysed in detail, showing how they were concluded. Different real-world 
scenarios showed the consistency and inconsistency of the privacy risks models. The secondary data 
that was collected, was considered current, reliable and could be located easily, as described in Table 
3.2. 
4.4.2.2 Trial coding 
Trial coding involves applying categories from the coding frame to the material. This is done by 
following the same procedure followed in the segmentation section. Upon trial coding, there were no 
changes identified, which resulted in the coding already conducted in the segmentation, not to change. 
The final results were presented in Appendices E, F, G and H based on each report. 
4.4.2.3 Evaluating and modifying the coding frame 
The researcher evaluated the coding frame by thoroughly examining the results of the trial coding, 
focusing on consistency and validity. Upon piloting, by repeating the building of the coding framework, 
no additional categories were identified. Categories correctly described the context and the concepts, to 
answer the research question. 
4.4.3 Main analysis 
The analyses of the project reports in this research were performed using 4 phenomena checklist factors 
as seen in Table 4.5. Phenomena factors are shown in the first row of Table 4.6. A total of 38 instances 
were identified from the 4 phenomena checklist factors in each project report as shown in Table 4.6. 
Identified instances fell into all the phenomena; privacy risk consequence had the highest instances 




Table 4.6: Privacy risk identification model content analysis results 
Report Risk standard 







Smart metering implementation 
programme 
0 0 9 0 
Privacy impact assessment on 
the linkage of the address 
register with census data/contact 
data 
0 0 1 3 
Draft communications data bill 
privacy impact assessment 
0 0 7 0 





Totals 5 5 23 5 
 
Figure 4.3 below is the graphical representation of all instances recorded of each phenomenon identified 
from the literature review.  
 
Figure 4.3: Privacy risk identification model content analysis coding results  
4.4.4 Discussion of the findings 
4.4.4.1 Risk standard or methodology 
There were only 5 identified instances of risk standard across all the reports analysed. Only 1 report, 
the consumer data right report, reflected the instances of risk standard. Instances of risk standard were 
not identified in the other reports. 
Risk standard or methodology, reflects the steps involved in the assessment of risk. It is a form of 
structural assessment based on a particular standard. One of the critical steps in risk assessment is risk 
identification, which was the focus in this section. There are different kinds of risk standards as shown 
in Chapter 2. These standards were compared to each other to give understanding and depict a standard 
for privacy risk identification. Upon review, in order to identify privacy risk, 4 components needed to 
be looked at; asset, vulnerability, threat and outcome.  
Instances of risk standard or methodology were only identified in 1 report; the consumer data right 
(Appendix H). These instances were not explicit and clearly articulated similarly to the literature review. 
The mention of risk standard was on a high level, depicting a view of a risk assessment methodology 
being followed. The methodology mentioned did not match any of the methodologies in the literature 
review. There is a common view of following a particular standard for guidance and it is understood 
the standards mentioned in the literature review, were not in the exhausted list of all available standards. 
This common view of following a particular standard is evident in Appendix H, ‘The threats identified 
in this section have been assessed according to a modified form of the Treasury’s risk rating matrix’. 
There are also instances mentioned, reflecting the process followed in the risk assessment standard, 
‘The likelihood and consequence descriptions in Treasury’s risk rating matrix were modified to be more 
relevant to the CDR’. Based on the content analysed, it was evident that both risk standard and 





4.4.4.2 Privacy risk likelihood 
There were only 5 identified instances of privacy risk likelihood across all the reports analysed. Only 1 
report, which is the Consumer Data Right, reflected the instances of privacy risk likelihood. Instances 
of privacy risk likelihood were not identified in the other reports. 
According to the literature review in Chapter 2, privacy risk likelihood is the probability or chance for 
a privacy threat to cause harm, given there is a vulnerability. Privacy risk likelihood is derived by 
assessing the threat that is likely to cause harm, given a severity of a vulnerability. The threat likelihood 
level (very low, low, moderate, high, and very high) to cause harm, given the level of privacy 
vulnerability severity, determines the overall privacy risk likelihood. The constructed privacy risk 
identification model reflected the privacy risk likelihood by questioning ‘how likely’ would a threat 
event cause harm during data analytics three-step process.  
The same concept of a privacy risk likelihood was reflected in the report. The difference of privacy 
vulnerability severity was not taken into consideration when deriving the privacy risk likelihood. The 
report only considered the privacy threat likelihood as coded in Appendix H, ‘The risk assessment 
framework takes into account the likelihood of each threat occurring and the severity of their potential 
consequences to determine a risk rating between ‘Very Low’ and “Severe’. Privacy threat likelihood 
ratings are also reflected similarly to how they were reflected in the literature review; the only difference 
was the description of ratings. The literature review reflected ratings as very low, low, moderate, high, 
and very high. The report coding in Appendix H, reflected ratings as rare, unlikely, possible, likely, and 
almost certain. ‘Table 2.4 below, provides guidance for determining the likelihood and consequence 
ratings for the privacy impacts identified in the CDR. The risk ratings are applied to the identified 
threats to determine the overall rating’.  
4.4.4.3 Privacy risk consequence 
There were 23 identified instances of privacy risk consequence across all the reports analysed. In all the 
reports, there was at least 1 instance of the privacy risk consequence being identified. The highest 
occurrence was identified in the smart metering report, followed by data bill privacy impact, consumer 
data right and lastly, linkage of the address register report. 
According to the literature review, privacy risk consequence was the risk identified from a threat event 
and the impact it could present. The impact was based on the different types of harm, which could be 
caused by a privacy risk. These types of harm are given a severity rating when there is a privacy threat 
event. The results showed the privacy risk consequence was a combination of a threat event and the 
severity of harm that it could present. This was reflected in a form of a table. The table is the guide to 
identify the consequence level (very low, low, moderate, high, and very high) at which the threat could 
present. The constructed privacy risk identification model reflected privacy risk consequence by 
questioning ‘how serious’ would a threat event cause harm during the data analytics three-step process.  
The consumer data right report reflected exactly the same concept for privacy risk consequence as in 
the literature review. In Appendix H, it can be seen that the table referenced, ‘provides guidance for 
determining the likelihood and consequence ratings for the privacy impacts identified in the CDR. The 
risk ratings are applied to the identified threats to determine the overall rating is similar to literature 
review table’ is similar to Table 2.5 in the literature review. The difference is on the rating descriptions. 
The literature review reflected a rating level in the form of very low, low, moderate, high, and very 
high; while the table in the report reflected a rating level of insignificant, minor, moderate, major and 
extreme. The other type of instances identified were generic, and do not necessarily reflect the process 
towards building a privacy identification model. These instances reflect the harm privacy risk could 
present and not giving it a severity level. In Appendix E, these instances can be seen clearly, for 
example, ‘There is a risk that a consumer’s energy consumption data and other information, such as 
financial data, will be visible to visitors’. These instances do not clearly indicate the type of harm the 





was the only report that reflected the types of harm that privacy risk could present ‘The assessment of 
the potential severity of the consequences of a privacy threat being realised has sought to take into 
account harm arising from: • the infringement on the individual’s fundamental human right to privacy; 
• any financial loss; • personal and psychological harm; • emotional harm falling short of psychological 
harm, including arising from a feeling of violation or from suffering inconvenience; and • consequential 
loss, such as rectification costs’. 
4.4.4.4 Privacy risk level 
There were 5 identified instances of privacy risk levels across all the reports analysed. Only 2 reports 
reflected the instances of privacy risk level. The highest occurrence was identified in the linkage of 
address register report, followed by consumer data right. 
According to the literature review in Chapter 2, the privacy risk level was the rating of the privacy risk 
that was identified from a threat event. The privacy risk level was derived from the assessment of the 
privacy risk likelihood and the privacy risk consequence. The privacy risk level (very low, low, 
moderate, high, and very high) was determined by combining the levels of privacy risk likelihood and 
privacy risk consequence. The constructed privacy risk identification model reflected the privacy risk 
level as the final output to risk identification. The description of each level determines the severity of 
the privacy risk that was identified. 
The consumer data right reflected the same process to derive the privacy risk level. In Appendix H, the 
table referenced, has the same structure of the table reflected in the in the literature review, ‘Table 4: 
Modified form of Treasury's risk rating matrix’. The difference is the privacy risk output levels upon 
combining the levels of the privacy risk likelihood and the privacy risk consequence. This could be the 
result of the mention in Appendix H, that the risk rating matrix was modified, ‘The likelihood and 
consequence descriptions in Treasury’s risk rating matrix were modified to be more relevant to the 
CDR’. Instances identified in the other reports, did not reflect how the risk level was derived, although 
they did show the risk level table and how the privacy risks were assigned a level. Appendix F clearly 
reflected the table and privacy risk levels, ‘A table which outlines risk of non-compliance with the 
Privacy Act can be found in Appendix 3, including a risk rating (high, medium, low)’. The privacy risk 
identification process ends with identifying the privacy risk level; this seems to be dependent on 
different risk standards or methodologies. This can be seen in Appendix F, where a specific risk table 
was mentioned, ‘Appendix 3 - Compliance Risk Table Australian’. 
4.4.5 Summary of the research findings 
Table 4.7 below is the summary of the research findings compared to the literature review. The 
researcher summarised the research findings based on the constructed privacy risk model, phenomena 
considerations and how phenomena are reflected in the literature review constructed model. 
Table 4.7: Summary of the research findings 




Risk standard or 
methodology used 
 Research findings reflected at a high level the same 
considerations of a privacy risk standard as in the 
literature review. It is critical to consider the risk 





 Research findings reflected the same privacy risk 
likelihood as in the literature review. 
 Research findings do not show vulnerabilities being 
considered in the process of identifying privacy risk 
likelihood, while the literature review considered the 
vulnerabilities in this process. 
Privacy risk 
consequence 
 Research findings reflected the same concept and 





the literature review. Research findings also revealed 
that privacy risk consequence is normally generalised 
due to the rigorous process of formalising.  
 Research findings also show privacy risk consequence 
as a risk identified from threat event and the impact it 




Privacy risk level  Research findings reflected the same privacy risk level 
identification concept as in the literature review. 
 Research findings reflected different views on 
identifying the privacy risk level. Other privacy risk 
levels were pre-determined and others followed the 
same formalised process as in the literature review, 
where privacy risk level is the gauge of the risk 




This section of the research paper presented the process and findings of the qualitative content analysis 
conducted on the data collected. Both research questions were analysed separately using the same data 
collected, and following the same content analysis process. Results are presented and the main analysis 
was conducted separately for each research question, where findings were discussed and summarised. 
Research Question 1 refers to privacy vulnerabilities and threats, while research Question 2 refers to 





5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 of this research paper concludes the research study by presenting the concluding findings 
with respect to the objectives based on the research Questions 1 and 2, together with recommendations. 
The concluding findings with respect to the objectives, reviewed the aim of the research, literature 
review and findings of the research. The recommendations presented, indicate the direction, which the 
research proposes. The research was thereafter concluded by looking at all aspects covered in this 
research paper. 
5.2 Findings with respect to objectives 
5.2.1 Privacy vulnerabilities and threats 
The objective of the research was to construct a privacy risk identification model. In order to identify 
the privacy risks, there needed to be an understanding of the privacy vulnerabilities and threats that 
would feed into the privacy risk identification model, as to what were the main causes of privacy risks. 
Research Question 1 of the research paper refers to the following question:  
What are the privacy vulnerabilities and threats leading to privacy risks during the big data analytics 
phase?  
The literature review indicated that by definition, a risk is caused by the vulnerabilities given there is a 
threat to exploit assets. The definition aligns with the research question from the perspective of 
vulnerability and threats. Data is the asset at risk. The vulnerabilities and threats analysed in this 
research paper were based on the big data analytics operational steps. Figure 2.17 reflects the 
vulnerabilities identified in the literature review and research findings. There were 8 vulnerabilities 
identified that could lead to privacy risks. The literature review reflected 7 different vulnerabilities, 
which aligned with the vulnerabilities that were identified from the research findings. Additionally, the 
research findings reflected 1 vulnerability that was not identified in the literature review. There were 
also 2 main threats that could exploit vulnerabilities during the stages of big data analytics as shown in 
Table 5.1. The literature review reflected 2 types of threats that could exploit vulnerabilities and cause 
privacy risks. The research findings aligned with only 1 type of threat and did not reflect any findings 
of the other type of threat.  
Table 5.1: Final research vulnerabilities and threats 






Data owner consent   
Data security   
Data integrity   
Data computational methods   
Data analytic processing tool   
Access control   
Education   
Governance   
Data privacy 
threats 
Organisations with access to data    








5.2.2 Privacy risk identification model 
As previously mentioned, the objective of the research was to have a standardised privacy risk 
identification model to assist in identifying privacy risk during data analytics operational steps. It is 
crucial that there is a standardised process followed, to identify privacy risk that needs to be mitigated, 
prior to the benefits big data analytics being realised. This will assist in identifying and making sure 
that all possible privacy risks are mitigated. Research Question 2 of the research paper, refers to the 
following question: 
What is the risk identification model that can be used to identify privacy risks during the analytics 
phase? 
In the literature review, different risk standards and methodologies were reviewed and compared, to 
find and construct a privacy risk identification model. The research findings also reflected a high level 
of a risk standard or methodology was followed to identify privacy risk. Most importantly, a rigorous 
process was followed to identify privacy risks, essentially leading to a privacy risk identification model. 
This process looked at the evaluation of vulnerability and threats that are presented by different events, 
depending on the context of the data processing. The literature review reflected that vulnerability and 
threats should first be assessed separately, and given the severity, such that when they are combined, 
they are able to give a likelihood of a threat event to cause harm. The research findings only reflected 
the likelihood of a threat event to cause harm but did not show vulnerabilities and threats being assessed 
separately. It only reflected the threat being the main driver of the likelihood to cause harm. According 
to the literature review, this has to be followed by checking the consequences of harm (how serious can 
harm be detrimental?). The consequences could result in either tangible or intangible harm. The 
consequences also need to be assigned a severity, depending on the context of data processing. The 
research findings also reflected the same notion on assessing consequences, even though some other 
findings on consequences were general and did not have severity assigned to them. The final step of the 
process was to combine the likelihood and consequence to identify the risk level. This is what the 
privacy risk identification model was based on during each big data analytic operational step. The model 
looks at the likelihood and the seriousness of the threat event to cause harm. Table 5.2 summarises the 
discussion above, reflecting which aspects were covered in the literature review and content analysis 
research. The privacy risk identification model constructed, shown in  
Table 2.7 is considered verified by the research conducted.  
Table 5.2: Final privacy risk identification model features 










Risk standard or 
methodology used 





Step 1: Vulnerability assessment    
Step 2: Threats assessment   
Step 3: Overall likelihood   
Privacy risk 
consequence 
Step 4: Level of impact   
Privacy risk 
identification 







There needs to be a common practice between different privacy risk assessment models, considering 
the governance of the different industries and countries. Privacy is a sensitive issue and it could be 
detrimental and cause great harm if there is no privacy risk identification model. The privacy risk 
identification model has to be comprehensive in order to make sure it covers all aspects for the 
mitigations to be put in place. This calls for more research in different areas, where data is somehow 
generated, collected, processed and shared. The principles of a privacy risk identification model in the 
different industries should be looked at, in order to have an exhaustive list of data present of all the 
possible vulnerabilities and threats. The future research should focus on the privacy risk analysis and 
evaluation following the privacy risk standard or methodology.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This research paper presented the research of a privacy risk identification model on big data analytics. 
Advancing technology on big data analytics called for this research due to the increase of privacy risks. 
The causes of privacy risk, together with a privacy risk identification model constructed in the literature 
review, were verified by the research study. The research conducted, aligned with the main aspects 
covered in the literature review. The research aspects not covered in the literature review and those 
covered in the literature review but not in the research, complement each other. This provides a 
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7 Appendix A 
Smart Metering Implementation Programme – Vulnerabilities and Threats Coding 

















Education Governance Organisations 





to data  
Stakeholder groups have advised that some consumers believe that 
there are risks to their privacy relating to the processing of data and 
that such data could be used to identify their lifestyle and patterns of 
behaviour. 





There is a perception that data could be collected and used without the 
individual’s knowledge, or… 
1 
      
 
  
It is important that industry and third parties are clear with individuals 
concerning the processing of their personal data 
   
1 




This is why the Government has developed requirements within its 
data access and privacy framework to protect consumers. 





by specifying that parties using data provide appropriate information to 
their customers about this processing and by ensuring consistency in 
approach. 
   
1 




Poorly presented information could lead to public opposition and 
negative media attention. 
 
1 
     
 
  
Data controllers should ensure that consumers are provided with 
consistent and unambiguous information about their rights, as defined 
in the data access and privacy framework 
 
1 
     
 
  
One of the principles of the data access and privacy policy framework 
is that individuals should have a choice about how their data is used, 
1 
      
 
  
This includes information about what data is being collected, the 
identity of the data controller and if the consumer has a choice as to 
whether the data can be collected for that purpose. 
1 
      
 
  
to help inform consumers about the steps their members will take to 
make sure that consumers are aware how and why their data is used, 
and the choices consumers have in sharing this data, prior to the 
finalisation of Government policy. 
1 






privacy advocates argue that privacy rights could be infringed from the 
processing of half- hourly data -without consumer consent 
1 








-level could indicate the daily habits and behavioural patterns of an 
individual or household, or lead to unwanted marketing activity. 
      
1  
  
Privacy and consumer stakeholders have also put forward the argument 




     
 
  
Only the consumer will be able to see this near real-time data, unless 
they have authorised another party to access that data. 




Allow suppliers to access monthly (or less granular) energy 
consumption data, for billing and for the purposes of fulfilling any 
existing statutory requirement or licence obligation 




Require that suppliers must receive explicit (opt-in) consent from the 
customer in order to access half-hourly energy consumption data, or to 
use energy consumption data for marketing purposes. 
1 
      
 
  
In addition, obligations under the Data Protection Act specify that in 
order to mitigate the risk of excessive or unnecessary data processing, 
“personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed 
 
1 
     
 
  
Aggregation, where appropriate, can help to address any privacy 
concerns in the sense that information about individuals cannot be 
identified from the data 
  
1 
    
 
  
In terms of third parties, the granularity of data used will depend on the 
terms and conditions of the service that consumers consent to 
1 
      
 
  
Where consumers give third parties permission to access their energy 
consumption data remotely via the DCC, third parties will have to 
comply with arrangements to protect consumers 




The DCC and its data and communication service providers will have 
to meet requirements on transmitting data. Given the volume and detail 
of the data it is important that data is transmitted securely and 
processes are put in place to ensure that data remains secure and 
privacy is protected 
   
1 
   
 
  
a) retrieve consumer data stored on the meter on behalf of the data 
controller or an authorised requestor e.g. retrieve a meter „reading‟; b) 
send data or instructions to the meter e.g. in regard to setting a new 
tariff; or c) convey an alert message from the meter to an authorised 
data controller 
   
1 






Where the DCC is transmitting data on instruction from the authorised 
data controller, it would be the responsibility of the data controller to 
manage their own obligations under licence conditions 





The Government intends to make clear through the Smart Energy Code 
that the DCC will fulfil its role in line with the Data Protection Act, 
and in a way which does not prevent others from fulfilling their own 
obligations 





The DCC will perform checks to determine whether a data request has 
originated from an authorised requestor 





the DCC is not expected to store consumption data except in short term 
buffering periods, which it would use to manage its flow of data 
requests and system data messages effectively 





The Government is continuing to consider the arrangements for 
ensuring that third parties (and suppliers where they are not the 
registered supplier) verify that any request for data access comes from 
the individual in the premises in question 





could be compromised through a breach in security allowing unlawful / 
unauthorised access 





In order to ensure the ongoing security of smart meter systems the 
Government is taking a „security by design‟ approach, in which 
security concerns are considered and addressed at every stage 
throughout the development lifecycle 





Government response to a consultation on a licence condition relating 
to security risk assessments and audits in the period before the DCC 
provides services to smart meters 





The security requirements provide for key security controls in areas 
such as the encryption of sensitive data, checks on the validity of 
critical commands sent within the system, and the tamper resistance of 
metering equipment (amongst other areas) 





The Government`s Consultation on the second version of the Smart 
Metering Equipment Technical Specifications considered how security 
requirements should be governed 





to identify challenges in order to ensure an appropriate level of security 
within the smart metering system 





the Government is developing an assurance regime that will enable 
security arrangements to be reviewed on an ongoing basis in order to 
maintain the security of smart metering systems 





the Government published a response to its consultation on the draft 
licence condition with regard to obliging suppliers to carry out security 
risk assessments and independent annual audits for their smart meter 
end to end systems 








Data controllers are able to work with their service providers to 
consider how to operate their systems in a secure way which is most 
appropriate to the technology they use 





Some stakeholders have raised questions about the potential use of 
smart metering energy consumption data by law enforcement agencies, 
local authorities and central Government departments, and about the 
extent to which this would impact on consumers’ privacy. 
 
1 




Smart meter data potentially offers more detailed information about 
energy usage than had previously been available, and this may lead to 
increased requests for access to personal data from law enforcement 
agencies (such as the police) 





Data controllers should take care to verify that the request is from an 
appropriate authority and be satisfied that the authority has stated that 
the disclosure of the data is necessary for the purposes of crime 
prevention or detection 





It is important to note that data that is produced by conventional meters 
is currently legitimately accessed by public bodies 





The Government will need to have access to some smart metering data 
for the purposes of statistical analysis, monitoring and evaluation of the 
Smart Metering Implementation Programme 





The Government has set out its approach to requesting information 
from suppliers and network companies in the Response to the 
consultation on information requirements for monitoring and 
evaluating the roll-out of smart meters 





data on to third parties in order to receive a specific service, consumers 
are clear about the implications of doing so 
1 
      
 
  
Government is clear that consumers should be able to access their own 
smart metering energy consumption data easily, and share this with 
third parties 





The process for connecting a third-party device will be consumer 
friendly and secure, to prevent someone else from accessing an 
individual’s data by connecting a device to their Home Area Network 





Consumers could choose to send this data onto third parties if they 
wished to 
1 
      
 
  
Third parties would be bound by relevant legislation such as the Data 
Protection Act 





the Government is conscious that data captured via the HAN which is 
sent on to third parties could include more granular near real-time data 




, it is important that consumers are clear about what is involved 1 






Stakeholders from the energy industry and consumer and privacy 
groups have indicated that there is a risk that a new tenant may try to 
access the previous tenant’s energy consumption data, either via the 
DCC or over the Home Area Network (HAN) directly. 





As the smart metering system will retain up to 13 months of 
consumption data within the meter, incoming residents may try to 
access the historic consumption data of the previous resident either in 
error or deliberately 





The Government has included a security capability in the Smart 
Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS) to restrict 
access to data 





Where a consumer is on a prepayment plan with their supplier and their 
meter is hard to access, they may be issued with a Prepayment 
Interface Device. This Interface Device would ordinarily be owned by 
the supplier and as with the IHD, any data relating to the previous 
tenant would need to be erased on change of tenancy 





Data controllers need to be able to collect data for a number of 
purposes, but there is a perception and potential privacy impact that 
data controllers could hold on to it for longer than they need to. 
 
1 
     
 
  
The Government will rely on the fifth Data Protection Act Principle in 
regard to the timescale for which data should be retained by data 
controllers or data processors. This principle is that personal data 
processed for any purpose, or purposes, shall not be kept for longer 
than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
 
1 
     
 
  
Where a customer holds an account with a supplier, that customer may 
be concerned that a non-account holder may gain access to their energy 
consumption data without the customer`s permission. The customer`s 
data might then be used where that customer is not fully aware of such 
usage. 
1 





Suppliers have confirmed that only account holders will be able to gain 
access to the customer`s account and the details contained on that 
account 





Stakeholders from the energy industry and consumer and privacy 
groups have indicated that consumers may be concerned that their 
energy consumption data is not deleted from the Smart Metering 
System and could be accessed either via the DCC or over the Home 








There is no requirement to enable the deletion of data, but there is a 
requirement for the metering equipment to have a secure perimeter 
(physical and communication) to prevent unauthorised access to data. 
In addition, there is a requirement for „restrict access to data flags‟ in 
the data store to prevent access to data that has been generated, for 
example, by a previous tenant. The responsibility is on the consumer to 
notify the supplier in order for the „restrict access to data flag‟ to be 











Once the DCC is operational it will also apply „restrict access to data‟ 
flags. This capability will be activated for example once the outgoing 
tenant informs their supplier that they will be moving home. No party 
will be able to access historic energy consumption data from the meter 








The consumer is therefore responsible for controlling access to any 
data that is displayed on it. 





In-Home Displays will ordinarily be located inside a consumer’s 
premises, and under the control of the consumer, who will be able to 
decide whether or not others visiting their premises should be allowed 
to see the IHD 





For example, the Government will require that suppliers and third 
parties should provide reminders to consumers about the data that they 
are accessing, and how consumers can change the arrangements if they 
wish to. In this way consumers can continue to control the choices they 
make 
       1   
The Privacy Charter is not intended to take the place of regulatory 
requirements, but will need to reflect any regulatory framework that is 
put in place. Energy UK will continue to develop the Privacy Charter 
with the support of consumer groups and other industry 
representatives, and the intention is that this charter will be available 
when the data access and privacy framework comes into force 
       1   
However, the Government has not yet decided on precisely how this 
should work in practise, such as whether the CIN approach should be 
purely optional, as one way for third parties to verify the individual, or 
whether it should be mandatory 
       1   





8 Appendix B 
Privacy Impact Assessment on the Linkage of Address Register with Census Data/Contact Data – 
Vulnerabilities and Threats Coding 














Education Organisations with 
access to data  
External parties with 
access to data  
When people trust that their personal information will be used 
as they have agreed or as set out in statute or a clear privacy 
notice, and when they accept that enough value will be created, 
they are likely to be more comfortable with its use 
1 
        
Function creep describes a situation where information 
collected for one purpose is then used for other unintended and 




       
This is especially the case when addresses from the two sources 
(Census and the Address Register) are largely identical in 
content and representation, not to mention that Census 
addresses also play an important role in the linking process 
  
1 
      
Under the Privacy Act, Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 5 
requires the ABS to take reasonable steps either to notify the 
individual of certain matters, or to take reasonable steps to 
ensure the individual is aware of the fact, circumstances and the 
purposes of collection. 
1 
        
It is worth noting that under APP 5.2(b)(ii), even if the 
information is not collected directly from individuals, the ABS 
is obliged to notify of the collection of indirectly solicited 
personal information into its information collection processes. 
1 
        
IIS notes that unnoticed or covert collection (e.g. information 
that is observed, derived or inferred by the ABS without 
confirming with the individual) is less controlled by individuals 
and therefore carries higher privacy risks. 
   
1 
     
Unnoticed or covert collection may also lead to data quality 
issues as individuals are less likely to be in a position to correct 
information that they are unaware has been collected 
 
1 




participants indicated that they expected the ability to opt out of 
the process (both 
1 
        
As mentioned, generally indirect collection of personal 
information increases privacy risk, as individuals have less 




       
, there is potential for the proposed linkages to be criticised by 
the community, the media or privacy advocates. Criticisms may 
also arise because the process of the proposed linkages is 
misunderstood or misrepresented 
      
1 
  
, and that entities from both the public and private sector are 
interested in obtaining the list, consultations are essential to 
address community concerns 
        
1 
Otherwise, the ABS may not be able to provide confidence to 
stakeholders that security of the information has been 
maximised and their privacy has been respected 
     
1 
   
the exposure of their identity, or their personal safety if 
addresses are leaked (which is unlikely given the ABS 
     
1 
   
for instance, when some people become less willing to provide 
answers in Census that will potentially lead to an increased 
chance of being selected in subsequent surveys 
 
1 
       
The longer the personal information is held by ABS, the more 
protection, storage and security controls that need to be in 
place. 
     
1 
   
Information collected is protected in accordance with the 
Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework 
     
1 
   
When no longer required, personal information is destroyed or 
deleted according to the Administrative Functions Disposal 




       
All ABS staff are subject to security checks and are required to 
sign an Undertaking of Fidelity and Secrecy under section 7 of 
the Census and Statistics Act 
     
1 
   




9 Appendix C 
Draft communications data bill privacy impact assessment- Vulnerabilities and Threats Coding 
















with access to data  
External 
parties with 
access to data  
There is a risk that a public authority incorrectly authorises a request to 
obtain communications data or that a request is made which is inaccurate. 
These errors could cause unnecessary or disproportionate intrusion. 
    
1 
    
When communications data is obtained by a public authority from a CSP 
or ISP there is a risk that it includes the personal data of individuals who 
subsequent analysis shows are not connected with the relevant 
investigation and not implicated in any crime 
      
1 
  
Subscriber details for all of these numbers may be obtained in order to 




       




       
There is a risk that CSPs could use without authorisation or otherwise 
mishandle the communications data they retain under ATCSA, EU DRD, 
or the ECHR. 
1 
        
It is possible, for example, that data on customers might be lost or misused 
or that data held under the new legislation might be exploited for business 
purposes 
     
1 
   
An error (such as incorrect transcription of a phone number) may occur at 
the CSP leading to the return of incorrect data. New 
   
1 
     
There is a risk that through a breach of security, communications data held 
by CSPs could be obtained by an unauthorised third party. 
New 







There is a risk that as equipment is decommissioned and retention periods 
expires data is not properly destroyed leading to a breach of the DPA 
 
1 
       




10 Appendix D 
Consumer Data Right – Vulnerabilities and Threats Coding 


















with access to 
data  
External parties with 
access to data  
A third party may pose as the accredited data recipient in order to acquire the 
individual’s information directly from the individual 
     
1 
   
A third party may use a false identity to acquire information from the accredited data 
recipient that the accredited data recipient had previously collected directly from the 
individual. 
    
1 
    
The individual may engage an accredited data recipient who instead seeks data 
outside the CDR system. 
     
1 
   
The individual may authorise the accredited data recipient to use or collect their data 
in a way that they did not genuinely intend 
 
1 
       
The individual may inadvertently authorise a level of access or use of their data 
beyond what is required for the services they are seeking. 
 
1 
       
The information that the individual discloses in the course of seeking services may be 
used or disclosed by the accredited data recipient without authorisation 
1 
        




       
The accredited data recipient may limit the individual’s free choice by including 
contract terms that require access to the individual’s data in exchange for a service 
 
1 
       
A non-accredited data recipient may request that the consumer access and download 
their own CDR data directly, and provide it to the data recipient in exchange for a 
service 
    
1 
    
The accredited data recipient may direct the individual to a fake website posing as the 
data holder’s website 
1 




A third party may pose as the accredited data recipient to gain access to the 
individual’s authorisation information from the individual; or they may tamper with 
the accredited data recipient’s information systems to do so 
1 
        
A third party may intercept an individual’s authorisation (including by hacking the 
data recipient’s system) as it is sent to the data holder 
1 
        
The individual may unintentionally authorise the disclosure of the wrong data to the 
accredited data recipient. 
1 
        
The individual may accidentally authorise a level of access to their data beyond what 
is necessary or required for the services they are seeking 
1 
        
The individual may unintentionally authorise the disclosure of the right data to the 
wrong accredited data recipient 
1 
        
The individual’s authorisation to disclose data may not be received by the data holder 1 
        
A third party may pose as the individual and authorise disclosure of data 1 
        
The data holder may improperly use or disclose the terms of the authorisation 1 
        
The data holder may seek alternative or additional information from the individual 
during the disclosure authorisation that is not required for the primary purpose of data 
transfer 
1 
        
The data holder may obstruct or dissuade the individual from transferring their data to 
the accredited data recipient. 
1 
        




       




       
The data holder may accidentally send the wrong individual’s data to the wrong 
accredited data recipient 
 
1 
       








The data holder may unintentionally fail to send any, or complete data to the 
accredited data recipient 
 
1 
       
The data holder may intentionally send inaccurate data. 
 
1 
       
The data holder may unintentionally send inaccurate data 
 
1 
       
The data holder may intentionally fail to send the data in a timely manner 
 
1 
       
The data holder may unintentionally fail to send the data in a timely manner 
 
1 
       
The data holder may send the data to the accredited data recipient in a format that 
frustrates its efficient and timely use 
 
1 
       
The data holder may intentionally send accurate but misleading data 
 
1 
       
The data holder may unintentionally send accurate but misleading data 
 
1 
       
A third party may intercept or interfere with the data during transfer between the data 
holder and the accredited data recipient 
 
1 
       
A third party may pose as the accredited data recipient to gain access to the 
individual’s raw transaction data from the data holder 
    
1 
    
The accredited data recipient, their employee or contractor may view or use the 
individual’s data without authorisation 
    
1 
    
The accredited data recipient may misuse the information provided by the individual 
in a way technically consistent with their authorisations 
1 
        
The accredited data recipient, their employee or contractor may disclose the 
individual’s data without authorisation 
1 
        
A third party may access the accredited data recipient’s systems and acquire or use an 
individual’s data without authorisation 
1 
        
The individual may experience increased threats to privacy due to improved insights 
about the individual enabled by analytics and better access to aggregated datasets. 
   
1 
     
The accredited data recipient may intentionally or unintentionally fail to delete or de-
identify data when required 
 
1 
       
The accredited data recipient may publicly release personal information that has not 




       
Data is not deleted or de-identified even though the accredited data recipient is no 
longer an eligible data custodian 
 
1 
       




11 Appendix E 
Smart Metering Implementation Programme – Privacy Risk Identification Model Coding 








There is a perception that data could be collected and used without the individual’s knowledge, or that individuals could be 
targeted with unwanted information (for example direct marketing) based on their energy consumption data without their prior 




The arguments around the use of half-hourly energy consumption data tend to vary between stakeholder groups. Some suppliers 
have argued that the processing of this data would lead to a greater realisation of benefits. On the other hand, consumer groups 
and 
privacy advocates argue that privacy rights could be infringed from the processing of half- hourly data -without consumer consent. 
More specifically, a concern is that data analysed at granular --level could indicate the daily habits and behavioural patterns of an 




Privacy and consumer stakeholders have also put forward the argument that where larger 
volumes of data are collected than are required for a particular purpose, it is possible that 
this capture of data could be excessive, and could result in a breach of the third Data 








Stakeholders from the energy industry and consumer and privacy groups have 
indicated that there is a risk that a new tenant may try to access the previous 




Data controllers need to be able to collect data for a number of purposes, but there 
is a perception and potential privacy impact that data controllers could hold on to it 








Stakeholders from the energy industry and consumer and privacy groups have indicated that consumers may be concerned that 
their energy consumption data is not deleted from the Smart Metering System and could be accessed either via the DCC or over 












12 Appendix F 
Privacy Impact Assessment on the Linkage of Address Register with Census Data/Contact Data – Privacy Risk 
Identification Model Coding 








Focus will be on perceived high risk areas. 
   
1 
A table which outlines risk of non-compliance with the 
Privacy Act can be found in Appendix 3, including a risk rating 
(high, medium, low). 
   
1 
IIS considers the following points have positive privacy 





Appendix 3 - Compliance Risk Table Australian 
   
1 





13 Appendix G 
Draft communications data bill privacy impact assessment – Privacy Risk Identification Model Coding 




Privacy Risk Consequence Privacy Risk Level 




The subject of the investigation may for example have made a number of calls just before a 
crime occurred in which the subject appears to be implicated. Subscriber details for all of 
these numbers may be obtained in order to establish if there was a criminal connection 





Collection of communication content is very intrusive. It is explicit in the proposed 
legislation that 
the collection of content cannot be authorised under the legislation. Any attempt to create a 




It is possible, for example, that data on customers might be lost or misused or that data 




An error (such as incorrect transcription of a phone number) may occur at the CSP leading 




There is a risk that through a breach of security, communications data held by CSPs could 
be 




There is a risk that as equipment is decommissioned and retention periods expires data is 
not 









14 Appendix H 
Consumer Data Right – Privacy Risk Identification Model Coding 
Coding Risk Standard or 
Methodology  




The threats identified in this section have been assessed according to a modified form of the 
Treasury’s risk rating matrix. T 
1 
   
The risk assessment framework takes into account the likelihood of each threat occurring and the 
severity of their potential consequences to determine a risk rating between “Very Low” and “Severe”. 
 
1 1 1 
The likelihood and consequence descriptions in Treasury’s risk rating matrix were modified to be 
more relevant to the CDR 
1 
   
This PIA applies the risk rating matrix below to categorise each of the threats identified in the next 
section. For example, Treasury considers that a situation that occurs rarely with a major consequence 
would have a “Low” rating. 
1 
   
Table 4: Modified form of Treasury's risk rating matrix 
 
1 1 1 
Table 5 below provides guidance for determining the likelihood and consequence ratings for 
the privacy impacts identified in the CDR. The risk ratings are applied to the identified 




Treasury conducted a series of internal workshops in order to determine an appropriate 
assessment of the likelihood and severity of each privacy threats. 
1 
   
Treasury used SATs 
such as a structured brainstorm and horizon scanning to apply different perspectives and 
ways of thinking to the problem, and reduce the possibility of groupthink. 
1 
   
 
The likelihood assessment does not reflect the probability of harm per interaction with the 
system. Adopting such an approach generally resulted in a ‘rare’ assessment against each 
threat and therefore did not provide meaningful information to a reader seeking to assess 







The likelihood of each threat occurring was also not assessed across the individual’s lifetime 




The assessment of the potential severity of the consequences of a privacy threat being 
realised has sought to take into account harm arising from: 
• the infringement on the individual’s fundamental human right to privacy; 
• any financial loss; 
• personal and psychological harm; 
• emotional harm falling short of psychological harm, including arising from a feeling of 
violation or from suffering inconvenience; and 




The severity of the consequence of the identified threat will vary based on any given 
situation. A given threat identified in the CDR may not result in any meaningful financial, 




Therefore, when assessing each threat, it is appropriate to consider that severity will 
generally follow a probability distribution rather than a discrete categorisation of severity 




TOTALS 5 5 6 2 
 
 
